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Abstract
Euthanasia and assisted suicide are highly controversial subjects that have drawn much attention in Canada
over the last two decades. This paper outlines how the Netherlands, the United States, Australia, and Canada
have approached the practices. Jurisprudence, public opinion polls, legislative developments, and the
positions of medical organizations and their members are included in the analysis. A number of arguments for
and against the continued prohibition of the practices in Canada are evaluated. As well, information regarding
the extent to which euthanasia and assisted suicide are performed in these countries is assessed. It will be
shown that Canadians currently enjoy significant control over decisions concerning the end of life. The
principles of autonomy and beneficence provide the foundation necessary to justify lifting the prohibition of
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada. With regard to the development of safeguards, the way in
which foreign jurisdictions have dealt with both procedures is highly instructive. A qualified system of pre-
authorization, unlike those adopted elsewhere, would prevent abuses from occurring and maintain the
prohibition of non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Since legislators are in the best position to deal with
the issues, change in the law should be made by the government, not the judiciary. Practical legislation is
feasible and a proposal of what this should entail is presented.
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EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED
SUICIDE IN THE POST-RODRIGUEZ
ERA: LESSONS FROM FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS©
BY MICHAEL CORMACK*
Euthanasia and assisted suicide are highly controversial
subjects that have drawn much attention in Canada
over the last two decades. This paper outlines how the
Netherlands, the United States, Australia, and Canada
have approached the practices. Jurisprudence, public
opinion polls, legislative developments, and the
positions of medical organizations and their members
am included in the analysis. A number of arguments for
and against the continued prohibition of the practices
in Canada are evaluated. As well, information
regarding the extent to which euthanasia and assisted
suicide are performed in these countries is assessed. It
will be shown that Canadians currently enjoy significant
control over decisions concerning the end of life. The
principles of autonomy and beneficence provide the
foundation necessary to justify lifting the prohibition of
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada.
With regard to the development of safeguards, the way
in which foreign jurisdictions have dealt with both
procedures is highly instructive. A qualified system of
pre-authorization, unlike those adopted elsewhere,
would prevent abuses from occurring and maintain the
prohibition of non-voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia. Since legislators are in the best position to
deal with the issues, change in the law should be made
by the government, not the judiciary. Practical
legislation is feasible and a proposal of what this should
entail is presented.
Au Canada, l'euthanasie et 'aide au suicide ont 6t6
l'objet d'attention et de controverses pendant les deux
derni~res decennies. Cet article d6crit comment ces
pratiques ont t6 abord6es aux Pays-Bas, aux Ettats-
Unis, en Australie et au Canada. La jurisprudence, les
sondages d'opinion, les d6veloppements 16gislatifs ainsi
que les positions de divers organisations medicales et
leurs membres sont inclus dans cette analyse. De
nombreux arguments en faveur et h l'encontre de
l'interdiction continue de ces pratiques au Canada sont
6valu6s. De plus, linformation quant a 'ampleur des
pratiques de l'euthanasie et de l'aide au suicide dans
d'autres pays est 6valude. L'auteur d6montre que les
canadiens exercent pr6sentement beaucoup de contr6le
quant aux ddcisions concemant la cessation de la vie.
Les principes de l'autonomie et de la bienfaisance
fourissent le fondement n&cssaire pour justifier ]a fin
de l'interdiction de l'euthanasie et de l'aide au suicide
volontaire au Canada. Quant aux sauvegardes, les
pratiques des autres juridictions sont r6v6latrices. Un
syst~me de pr6-autorisation, diff6rent de ceux
d6velopp~s ailleurs, pourrait A la fois pr6venir des abus
et pourrait maintenir linterdiction de l'euthanasie non-
volontaire et involontaire. Puisque les 16gislateurs sont
en meilleur position pour s'occuper de la question, les
changements devraient se faire par le biais de la
16gislation. Cet article propose ce dont pourrait
contenir un projet de loi addressant cette question
6pineuse.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Terry Graham, a resident of Brampton, Ontario, suffers from a
rare degenerative muscle disease known as mitochondrial myopathy.
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
With little muscle to protect his nerves, he experiences overwhelming
pain that cannot be entirely alleviated by morphine. He has been
lobbying federal officials for the right to have a physician-assisted death,
but his efforts have gone unrewarded.! The Graham case is only the tip
of the iceberg. Euthanasia and assisted suicide are highly controversial
subjects that have drawn much attention in Canada over the last two
decades. The issues surrounding the prohibition of both practices are
extremely complicated and demand an equally complex examination.
The discussion below will outline how the Netherlands, the United
States, Australia, and Canada have approached euthanasia and assisted
suicide. Jurisprudence, public opinion polls, legislative developments,
and the positions of medical organizations and their members will be
included in the analysis. A number of arguments for and against the
continued prohibition of the practices in Canada will be evaluated. As
well, information regarding the extent to which euthanasia and assisted
suicide are performed in these countries will be assessed. It will be
shown that Canadians currently enjoy much control over decisions
concerning the end of life. The principles of autonomy and beneficence
provide the foundation necessary to justify lifting the prohibition of
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada. With regard to the
development of safeguards in order to prevent abuse, the way in which
foreign jurisdictions have dealt with both practices is highly instructive.
Legislative reform is in order; the matter should not be left to the courts.
Workable legislation can be drafted and a proposal of just what that
should entail will also be presented.
II. DEFINING EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
Euthanasia can be classified as voluntary, non-voluntary, Or
involuntary.2 Voluntary euthanasia entails death at the request of the
person killed. Non-voluntary euthanasia does not involve a request for
assistance, because the personinvolved has never had the capacity or has
lost the capacity to make a request. Involuntary euthanasia occurs when
the person killed is capable of making a request but refuses or is not
consulted in the matter. Unbearable suffering underscores the motive
for killing in such an instance. However, legitimate cases of involuntary
I M. Mandel, "Fighting for a Chance to End his Life of Misery Terry Graham Dreams of
Death with Dignity, but his Life is the Real Nightmare" Toronto Sun (2 April 2000) 5 [hereinafter
"Death with Dignity in Toronto"].
2 p. Singer, Practical Ethics, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 176-81.
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euthanasia are hard to conceive of and closely parallel homicide.3
Euthanasia can also be characterized as active or passive.4 This
distinction is similar to the acts and omissions legal doctrine and rests on
the manner in which a person dies. While the distinction is sometimes
important, for reasons that will become evident, passive euthanasia will
not generally be referred to as euthanasia. Instead, passive euthanasia
will be classified as both: withholding life-sustaining treatment-
foregoing treatment that is potentially life-sustaining; and, withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment--ceasing previously initiated life-sustaining
treatment.5
As a result, voluntary euthanasia will be defined as a deliberate
act by one party with the intention of ending the life of another, at the
request of the latter, where the act causes death.6 Non-voluntary
euthanasia and involuntary euthanasia differ from voluntaiy euthanasia
with regard to the lack of a request or a refusal of death and the
competence of the person killed. Euthanasia, when referred to, will
encompass all three variants. Assisted suicide is less complex
conceptually and will be defined as: a deliberate act by one party with
the intention of assisting another to take his/her own life, by providing
the knowledge and/or means to do so, at the request of the latter.7 The
most important distinction between the above definitions of euthanasia
and assisted suicide concerns the person performing the act that
terminates life. In the case of euthanasia, another party performs the act
as opposed to assisted suicide where the person dying does so. In the
medical context, this difference implies that a physician administers a
death-causing substance in the case of voluntary euthanasia. With regard
to assisted suicide, the physician supplies the substance to the patient for
self-administration.8 At this point, an examination of the legality of the
above end-of-life practices in selected countries is in order.
3 Ibid. at 179.
4 Ibid. at 202-13.
5 Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, Of Life and Death-Final
Report (Ottawa: Senate of Canada, 1995) at c. 2, online: Government of Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/english/senate/com-e/euth-e/rep-ellad-e.htm#ii> (date accessed: 11 May
2001) [hereinafter Of Life and Death].
6 This definition is a composite (some elements omitted) of those outlined in: Ibid. & P.J. van
der Maas, J.J.M. van Delden & L. Pijnenborg, "Health Policy Special Issue: Euthanasia and Other
Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life" (1992) 22 Health Pol'y at 23 [hereinafter "Special
Issue"].
7 See "Special Issue," ibid.
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III. THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUTHANASIA
AND ASSISTED SUICIDE IN CANADA
Attempted suicide was prohibited in Canada's first Criminal
Code.9 The ban was lifted in 1972.10 Assisted suicide was also prohibited
under the Code, 189211 and, today, it remains a separate offence. 12
Section 241 of the Code, 1985 prohibits counselling or aiding suicide,
whether suicide ensues or not, and provides for a punishment of
imprisonment for a maximum term of fourteen years. 13 Acts of
euthanasia fall under the provisions relating to homicide.14 Life
imprisonment is the mandatory punishment for both first and second
degree murder, and a person is eligible for parole after serving a
minimum of twenty-five years or ten years of his or her sentence,
respectively.15 Manslaughter carries a maximum penalty of life
imprisonment but no mandatory minimum sentence, except when a
firearm is used (four years). 16 There are a number of other sections of
the Code, 1985 that are also relevant to euthanasia, assisted suicide, and
end-of-life decisions.17 Furthermore, Canadians cannot legally consent
to have death inflicted upon them.18
With regard to medical treatment, the Code, 1985 does not
require that patients accept unwanted treatment nor does it require the
administration of futile treatment (completely ineffective treatment).
Necessary palliative care (care aimed at relieving, as opposed to curing,
a person's physical, psychological, emotional, or spiritual suffering) that
results in the patient's death is not prohibited by the Code, 1985 as long
9 Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 238 [hereinafter Code, 1892].
10 Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1972, S.C. 1972, c. 13, s. 16.
11 Supra note 9, s. 237.
12 Criminal Cod4 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 241 [hereinafter Code, 1985].
13 Ibid
14 Ibi., ss. 222,229, 231,234-36.
15 Ibid, ss. 231,235. Ibid, s. 742, as am. byAn Act to amend the Criminal Code (sentencing) and
otherActs in consequence thereof, S.C. 1995, c. 22, s.6.
1 6 Ibid, ss. 234,236.
17 See, for example, ibid., ss. 45 (surgical operations), 215 (duiy of persons to provide
necessaries), 216 (duty of persons undertaking acts dangerous to life), 217 (duty of persons
undertaking acts), 220 (causing death by criminal negligence), 221 (causing harm by criminal
negligence), 245 (administering noxious thing), 265 (assault), 266 (assault), 267(assault with a
weapon or causing bodily harm), 268 (aggravated assault), 269 (unlawfully causing bodily harm).
18 Ibid., s. 14.
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as it conforms to medically accepted practice. The practice of total
sedation (rendering an individual totally unconscious via the
administration of drugs with no potential shortening of life) is legal if the
patient, or the patient's surrogate, consents. 19 As for surrogate and proxy
decisionmaking, advance directive legislation (legislation that enables
competent individuals to execute documents regarding health care
decisions to be made if the person becomes incapable of making such
decisions) has been enacted in nine provinces and one territory.20
At common law, medical treatment decisionmaking rests largely
with the patient. Except in emergency situations, physicians are required
to obtain informed consent from the patient before treatment is
administered and an action in battery lies against the physician if there is
treatment without consent.21 Consent that is inadequately informed
serves s the basis for an action in negligence against a physician. 22 A
physician must adhere to a patient's refusal of life-sustaining
treatment.23 Patients also have the right to have life-sustaining treatment
withdrawn.24 Respect for patients' decisions concerning their own
bodies, even though such decisions may result in death, are rooted in the
notions of autonomy and self-determination.25 However, the Supreme
Court of Canada decided that these principles do not justify ending the
prohibition of euthanasia or assisted suicide. 26
The leading case in Canada concerning euthanasia and assisted
suicide is the Rodriguez27 decision. Sue Rodriguez was forty-two years
19 Of Life and Death, supra note 5 at c. 4.
20 Personal Directives Act, S.A. 1996, c. P-4.03; Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c.
405; Health Care Directives and Consequential Amendments Act, S.M. 1992, c. 33; Advance Health
Care Directives Act, S.N. 1995, c. A-4.1; Medical Consent Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 279; Substitute
Decisions Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 30; Consent to Treatment and Health Care Directives Act, S.P.E.I.
1996, c. 10; Public Curator Act, S.Q. 1989, c. 54; Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, ss. 10-34;
Health Care Directives and Substitute Health Care Decision Makers Act, S.S. 1997, c. H-0.001; Health
Act, S.Y. 1990, c. 36, s. 45, am. by Enduring Powers of AttomeyAct, S.Y. 1995, c. 8, ss. 19-20.
21 Mulloy v. Sang, [1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (Alta. C.A.); and Malette v. Shulman (1990), 67 D.L.R.
(4th) 321 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Malette].
22 Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880; Ardt v. Smith, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 539; Hopp v. Lepp,
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 192; and Ciarlariello v. Schacter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119 [hereinafter Ciarlariello].
23 Malette, supra note 21.
24 Nancy B. v. H6tel-Dieu de Quibec (1992), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (Que. Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter
Nancy B.].
25 Ibid.; and Ciarlariello, supra note 22.
26 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 [hereinafter Rodfiguez].
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old and suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALs). Her condition
was deteriorating rapidly and she would have lost the capacity to speak,
swallow, move, and breathe without assistance. She sought an order
entitling her to assistance in committing suicide when the condition
became intolerable. She wanted a physician to establish the
technological means by which she could end her life by her own hand.
Thus, she sought to have section 241 of the Code, 1985 declared invalid
and to be of no force and effect pursuant -to section 52 of the
Constitution Act, 1982,28 to the extent that it prevented a terminally ill
individual from committing physician-assisted suicide. Rodriguez
claimed that section 241 violated her rights under sections 7, 12, and
15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.29 The British Columbia
Supreme Court dismissed the application. The majority of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed the decision and a majority (5-4) of
the Supreme C ourt of Canada dismissed the appeal. 30 The justices in
Rodriguez clearly advocated different approaches to euthanasia and
assisted suicide. The majority upheld the prohibition of both practices.
Chief Justice Lamer, and Justice Cory, dissenting, advocated the
decriminalization of assisted suicide only,31 while Justices McLachlin
and L'Heureux-Dub6, dissenting, indicated that euthanasia would also
be permissible) 2
The Supreme Court of Canada is not the only body to consider
legal reform in this area. The Law Reform Commission of Canada
released its working paper in 1982 and its report in 1983 on euthanasia,
assisted suicide, and the cessation of treatment.33 The Commission
recommended against decriminalizing or legalizing voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide. It suggested that the Code, 1985 be amended to
make it clear that physicians do not attract criminal liability for
administering appropriate palliative care that has the effect of
shortening a patient's life expectancy. Additionally, the Commission
28 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 52
[hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
2 9 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 28, ss.
7, 12, 15(1) [hereinafter Charter].
3 0 Rodriguez, supra note 26.
31 Ibid. at 578-79, Lamer C.J.C., 630-31, Cory J.
32 Ibid. at 624.
33 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment
(Working Paper 28) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1982); and Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Report on Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation of Treatment (Report
20) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1983) [hereinafter Euthanasia, 1983].
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recommended that the Code, 1985 be amended so that physicians would
not be held criminally responsible for not initiating or discontinuing
treatment for incompetent patients, when treatment was therapeutically
useless and not in the patient's best interest.34 In 1987, it reiterated its
recommendation regarding palliative care that shortens life. As well, it
proposed that mercy killing be treated as second-, not first-degree
murder, and that no fixed sentence be attached to second-degree
murder.35
In 1991, Private Member's Bill C-261 was introduced in the
House of Commons. Among other things, it proposed legalizing
euthanasia and would have protected physicians who administered
pain-killing treatment that simultaneously hastened death.36 The Bill
was dropped from the Order Paper after second reading.3 7 Also in 1991,
the British Columbia Royal Commission on Health Care and Costs
recommended that the Code, 1985 be amended to exempt health care
workers from liability when assisting terminally ill patients in suicide.
However, a consensus on voluntary euthanasia could not be reached and
no recommendations were made on the issue.38 In 1994, Bill C-215 was
introduced proposing to decriminalize physician-assisted suicide for
terminally ill patients, but died in the same manner as Bill C-261.39
In 1995, the Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and
Assisted Suicide released its report. The majority of the Committee
recommended that no changes be made to section 241 of the Code, 1985.
Concerns expressed included: the apprehension that legalizing assisted
34 Euthanasia, 1983, ibid. at 27-28.
35 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Recodifying Criminal Law (Report 31,
Revised and Enlarged Edition of Report 30) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1987)
at 58-61.
36 Bill C-261, An Act to Legalize the Administration of Euthanasia Under Certain Conditions to
Persons Who Request It and Who Are Suffering from an Irremediable Condition and Respecting the
Withholding and Cessation of Treatment and to Amend the Criminal Code, 3rd Sess., 34th Parl., 1991,
(1st reading 19 June 1991).
3 70f Life and Death, supra note 5 at "Appendix D: Chronology of Major Canadian
Developments and Events," online: Government of Canada
<http:/www.parl.gc.ca/35/2/parlbus/Chambus/senate/Com-e/euth-e/rep-ellad-a2-e.htm#d> (date
accessed: 14 May 2001).
38 M. Otlowski, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Toronto: Clarendon Press, 1997)
at 380-81.
39 Bill C-215, Act to Amend the Criminal Code, 1st Sess., 35th Par]., 1994, (1st reading 16
February 1994); and Of Life and Death, supra note 5 at "Appendix E: Legislative Proposals
Previously Introduced in Parliament," online: Government of Canada
<http:lwww.parl.gc.cat3512/parlbus /chambus/senate/com-e/euth-e/rep-ellad-a2-e.htm#e> (date
accessed: 14 May 2001).
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suicide would undermine the social value of respect for life; the fear that
changes could lead to abuses; and the worry of the slippery
slope-permitting assisted suicide in cases where persons were
competent would inevitably lead to changes that would allow the
procedure for incompetent persons. 40 The majority of the Committee
recommended that non-voluntary, involuntary, and voluntary euthanasia
remain criminal offences. However, the Committee suggested that the
Code, 1985 be amended so as to provide for less severe penalties in cases
of voluntary euthanasia that involve mercy or compassion. The majority
opposed euthanasia for essentially the same reasons it opposed assisted
suicide.41
In 1996, the Ontario Law Reform Commission released a study
paper that advocated an amendment to section 241 of the Code, 1985
that would have exempted health care professionals from liability when
assisting in another's suicide. However, the Commission recommended
that euthanasia remain a criminal offence. 42 Bill C-304, which would
have decriminalized assisted suicide for the terminally ill, was introduced
in 1997, but was dropped from the Order Paper after second reading. 43
Bill S-2 was first read on 13 October 1999 and recommended codifying
the common law practices relating to withdrawing and withholding
life-sustaining treatment. It also clarified that health care providers were
not liable to criminal sanction when medication that might shorten life
was administered for pain relief purposes. It died on the Order Paper in
October of 2000.44
End-of-life decisions have been continuously addressed in
Canada over the past two decades. The attempts to codify Canadian
jurisprudence have not borne fruit. The Canadian Medical Association's
(CMA) position is that "[tjhe withholding or withdrawal of inappropriate,
futile or unwanted medical treatment and the provision of
compassionate palliative care, even when that shortens life, is considered
40 Of Life and Death, ibid at c. 7
41 IbiL at c. 8.
42 J.M. Gilmour et al., Ontario Law Reform Commission, Study Paper on Assisted Suicide,
Euthanasia and Foregoing Treatment (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1997) at 261.
43 Bill C-304,Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Aiding Suicide), 2d Sess., 35th Pan., 1996, (1st
reading on 12 June 1996 and debated at second reading and dropped from the Order Paper on 6
March 1997).
44 Bill S-2, Act to Facilitate the Making of Legitimate Medical Decisions Regarding
Life-sustaining Treatments and the Controlling of Pain, 2d Sess., 36th Parl., 1999, (1st reading on 13
October 1999, referred to the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on 23
February 2000 and died on the Order Paper on 22 October 2000) [hereinafter Bill S-2].
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good and ethical medical practice."45 However, in other respects, CMA
policy is reflected in the law; changes to the law regarding voluntary
euthanasia and assisted suicide have outright failed. This complements
official CMA policy, which condemns physician participation in both
situations.46 However, the CMA'S policy does not mirror physician
opinion. A 1993 survey revealed that of the 923 respondent physicians,
60.5 per cent supported some type of legal change regarding voluntary
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide, while 28.9 per cent opposed
such measures. 47 In 1994, 866 Alberta physicians were asked whether it
is sometimes right to practice active euthanasia: 42 per cent replied yes,
47 per cent no, and 11 per cent were uncertain. In response to whether
the law should be changed to permit active euthanasia, the answers were
37 per cent yes, 47 per cent no, and 16 per cent uncertain. 48 In 1999, the
findings of a survey administered in 1995 were published. Of the 1,855
Canadian physicians polled, 49 per cent supported changing the law to
permit physician-assisted suicide; however, only 20 per cent would be
willing to practice it if it were legal; 57 per cent would not, and 23 per
cent were uncertain. 49 The above results indicate that the medical
community is extremely divided with regard to these practices.
Given the highly political nature of the debate, public sentiment
must also be considered. Since 1968, Gallup Polls have been conducted
in Canada usilng the following question: "When a person has an
incurable disease that causes great suffering, do you, or do you not think
that competent doctors should be allowed by law, to end the patient's
life through mercy killing, if the patient has made a formal request in
writing?"5 0 The results indicate that support increased dramatically
between 1968 (45 per cent yes, 43 per cent no, 12 per cent undecided)
and 1989 (77 per cent, 17 per cent, 6 per cent, respectively). Since then,
45 British Columbia Ministry of Attorney General, "British Columbia Guidelines on Active
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide" Press Release (4 November 1993), online: QL (LNHE).
46 Canadian Medical Association, "Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (Update 1998)" (Canada:
Canadian Medical Association, 1998), online: Canadiafi Medical Association <http:llwww.cma.ca/
inside/policybase/1998/06-19f.htm> (date accessed: 11 May 2001).
4 7 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 315.
48 M.J. Verhoef & T.D. Kinsella, "Alberta Euthanasia Survey: 3-Year Follow-up" (1996) 155
Can. Med. Ass'n J. 885 at 888.
49 T.D. Kinsella & M.J. Verhoef, "Determinants of Canadian Physicians' Opinions About
Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide: A National Survey" (1999) 32 Annals, Royal College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Canada 211 at 213-14.
50 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 261-62.
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public support has been relatively constant.5l The polling question
appears to encompass only voluntary euthanasia, in the medical context,
for those suffering from an incurable illness; although, it should be
expected that physician-assisted suicide in the same circumstances would
evoke similar support. In 1997, the Angus Reid Group conducted a
national poll on "Canadians' Views on Euthanasia." 52 While the
question appeared to refer only to suicide and assisted suicide for the
terminally ill, the results echoed the findings of a 1993 Angus Reid
survey: 76 per cent supported the right to die, 17 per cent opposed, and 7
per cent were unsure.53 Overall, there is substantial public support in
Canada for permitting the practices of assisted suicide and voluntary
euthanasia in certain circumstances.
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED
SUICIDE IN OTHER LEGAL REGIMES
A. Australia
Like Canadians, Australians have the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment and have it withdrawn.5 4 Currently, euthanasia and
assisted suicide are illegal in all states and territories.5 5 Various bills
aimed at legalizing voluntary euthanasia had been introduced in
Australia during the 1990s. 56 In 1995, after a mere three-month period,
legislation legalizing voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide was
passed in a "conscience vote" in the Northern Territory Legislative
51 Ibid. at 262. In response to the same question, 75 per cent answered yes, 17 per cent no, and
8 per cent undecided in 1995.
52 Angus Reid Group, "Canadians' Views on Euthanasia" (Ipsos-Reid, 1997), online: Angus
Reid Group <http://www.angusreid.com/media/content/displaypr.cfm?id-to-view=878> (date
accessed: 11 May 2001).
53 Ibid.
54 P.S. Florencio & R.H. Keller, "End-of-Life Decision Making: Rethinking the Principles of
Fundamental Justice in the Context of Emerging Empirical Data" (1999) 7 Health L.J. 233 at 239
[hereinafter "Fundamental Justice"]; J.I. Fleming, "Death, Dying and Euthanasia: Australia Versus
The Northern Territory" (2000) 15 Issues in Law and Medicine 291 [hereinafter Fleming]; B.
Kitchener & A.F. Jorm, "Conditions Required for a Law on Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Survey
of Nurses' Opinions in the Australian Capital Territory" (1999) 25 Journal of Medical Ethics 25
[hereinafter "Conditions Required"].
55 See, for instance, "Fundamental Justice," ibid.; and Fleming, ibid
56 See, for instance, Fleming, ibid.; and "Conditions Required," supra note 54.
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Assembly.5 7 After the supreme court upheld the validity of the
legislation,58 the Rights of the Terminally IllAct, 199559 came into force in
July of 1996, and the Northern Territory became the first district in the
world to legalize the procedures. 60 However, the legislation's life was
short. In March of 1997, ROTTI was effectively repealed by federal
legislation, the Euthanasia Laws Act, 1997,61 which prohibited the
territories from legalizing voluntary euthanasia. The primary reason for
the repeal of ROYTI was the fear that the legislation would lead to
abuse.62 Only four persons ended their lives under ROTt.63
ROTTI provided that a patient, at least eighteen years of age,
could request that a health care practitioner assist her or him in dying.
The practitioner or the patient could have administered the lethal
substance. The administering practitioner did not have to be a physician.
The patient had to be inflicted with an illness causing severe pain or
suffering that would have resulted in death. The practitioner must have
been satisfied that there was no reasonable medical treatment
acceptable to the patient that might have reasonably been undertaken in
hope of realizing a cure. Such reasonable treatment was confined to the
relief of suffering, pain, and/or distress, with the purpose of allowing the
patient to die comfortably. The patient could not have been diagnosed
with treatable clinical depression. The practitioner had to inform the
patient of the nature of the condition and all forms of treatment. A
practitioner, with special qualifications in the area, must have advised
the patient of his or her palliative care options and was required to
refuse to assist if there were alternatives reasonably available that would
have alleviated the patient's suffering to a degree acceptable to the
patient. A psychiatrist and another practitioner with prescribed
experience in the treatment of the particular illness afflicting the patient
57 R.S. Magnusson, 'The Sanctity of Life and the Right to Die: Social and Jursiprudential
Aspects of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia and the United States" (1997) 6 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y
J. 1 at 59, online: WL (PACRLPJ); "Conditions Required," ibid.
5 8 Wake v. Northern Teritory of Australia (1996), 109 N.T.R. 1 (S.C).
59 Rights oftheTenninallylllAct 1995 (N.T.) [hereinafter or].
60 "Fundamental Justice," supra note 54 at 240.
61 Euthanasia Laws Act, 1997 No.17 of 1997, online: Australian Legal Information Institute
< http ://wwwzustlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/legis/cth/conso1%5fac/el a1997161
/schl.html?query=%7e+ euthanasia+law+act+1997> (date accessed: 11 May 2001).
62 "Fundamental Justice," supra note 54 at 251; and S.I. Fraser & J.W. Walters,
"Death-Whose Decision? Euthanasia and the Terminally II" (2000) 26 Journal of Medical Ethics
121 at 122 [hereinafter "Whose Decision"].
63 "Whose Decision," ibid
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must have confirmed the first provider's diagnosis and prognosis. The
patient had to be of sound mind and had to have considered the effect
that the decision would have had on his or her family. The practitioner
must have been reasonably satisfied that the decision was made
voluntarily, freely, and after due deliberation. The patient was required
to have signed a request certificate no sooner than seven days after the
initial request. If the patient was unable to sign, he or she could request
that a disinterested party sign on his or her behalf. The medical
practitioner must have witnessed the signature. A second practitioner
must have signed the certificate in the presence of the patient and the
first doctor. The practitioners could not have stood to gain financially
from the patient's death. At least forty-eight hours must have elapsed
between the time the certificate was signed and the procedure was
performed. The patient had the ongoing right to rescind the request in
any manner and at any time. The practitioner must have assisted the
patient and/or remained present until the patient died. After the
patient's death, the assisting practitioner had to submit a report to the
coroner. Fines and terms of imprisonment for violations relating to
objectionable or improper conduct on behalf of the practitioner or
another party, and inaccurate record keeping, were also provided for in
ROTI. A practitioner was entitled to refuse to grant a patient's request at
any time, for any reason.64 It should be noted that the patient need not
have been competent at the time of administration; rather, it was
adequate that the patient had not indicated to the doctor a contrary
intention to go through with the procedure.65 Parliamentary debates
indicate that this provision was intended to accommodate persons who
had requested assistance but had subsequently lost decisionmaking
capacity.66
Although the Australian Medical Association has always
opposed voluntary euthanasia, 67 medical practitioners endorse law
reform. Pooled data from Australian health practitioner surveys indicate
that 57 per cent of doctors and 71 per cent of nurses support legal
change to permit voluntary euthanasia. 68 Moreover, public opinion
advocates the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.
Since 1962, a majority of those polled have been in favour of some form
64 ort, supra note 59 at ss. 3-12, 14.
65 Ibid., s .7(1)(o).
66 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 483-84.
67 Ibid at 318.
68 "Conditions Required," supra note 54 at 26.
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of assistance in dying. In 1995, a Morgan Gallup Poll indicated that 78
per cent of respondents were in favour of permitting the administration
of a lethal dose by a doctor to a hopelessly ill and suffering patient, 14
per cent against, and 8 per cent undecided.69 Of the ten separate polls
conducted since 1983 using the same question, the lowest level of
support occurred in 1986: 66 per cent for, 21 per cent against. 70 The
results suggest that the public supports changes in the law to allow for
voluntary euthanasia.
B. The United States
Americans also have the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
or have it withdrawn. 71 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
this right, for competent individuals, is constitutionally protected and is
underscored by liberty interests.72 Despite two federal appeal court
decisions to the contrary,73 the Supreme Court in Glucksberg held that
withdrawing and withholding treatment can be distinguished from
assisted suicide and as a result of the court's unanimous decision,
Americans do not have a constitutional right to assisted suicide.74 Forty-
one states have criminalized assisted suicide via statute. In six states and
the District of Columbia, it is a common law crime.75 In states that do
not have specific legislation, assisted suicide can be dealt with under
general criminal law statutes and can be treated as murder or
manslaughter. All acts of euthanasia are illegal in every state and are
69 The question asked was: "If a hopelessly ill patient, in great pain with absolutely no chance
of recovering, asks for a lethal dose, so as not to wake again, should a doctor be allowed to give a
lethal dose, or not?": Otlowski, supra note 38 at 263, n. 10.
70 lbidL
71 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
72 1bid; and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) [hereinafter Glucksberg].
73 Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane); and Quill
v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996).
74 Glucksberg, supra note 72.
75 A. Meisel & KL. Cerminara, The Right to Die, 2001 Cumulative Supplement to the 2d ed.
(Toronto: Aspen Law & Business, 2001) at 434; and Md. Ann. Code art. 27, § 416 (2001). Assisted
suicide is both prohibited via statute and is considered a common law crime in the states of
Maryland, Nevada, and South Carolina.
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classified as murder. 76
In 1994, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act 77 was passed by a
citizens' initiative.78 Implementation of the DDA was delayed by a court
injunction until 27 October 1997. Oregonians voted on Measure 51,
aimed at repealing the DDA, in November of that year. Sixty per cent of
voters opted to retain the DDA, as opposed to 40 per cent who voted
against it.79 Still in force, the Act legalizes assisted suicide under certain
conditions. Patients, at least eighteen years old, can request lethal
medical prescriptions from their physicians. The patient must be a
resident of Oregon and be suffering from a terminal disease (an
irreversible and incurable disease that will result in death within six
months). The physician must inform the patient of his/her diagnosis,
prognosis, the probable risks and results of the prescribed medication,
and the feasible alternatives. The physician must also refer the patient to
another physician for confirmation of the diagnosis, the patient's
capability, and the voluntariness of the request. The physician must refer
the patient to counselling where appropriate and recommend that
his/her family be informed of the decision. The patient is required to
make a total of three requests (two oral and one written). The patient
must be able to make and communicate health care decisions and the
request must be voluntary and signed without coercion. At least two
persons, other than the attending physician, must witness the signing.
Additionally, one witness cannot be related to the patient, stand to gain
financially from the death, nor be associated with the health care facility.
The second oral request must be made no sooner than fifteen days after
the initial one, at which time the physician must give the patient the
chance to rescind the request. No less than forty-eight hours must pass
between the writing of the prescription and the patient's written request.
Thus, patients must wait for at least fifteen days for their lethal
prescription to be written. The patient has the right to rescind the
request in any manner, at any time. Physicians are required to report all
lethal prescriptions written to the Oregon Health Division. No physician
is under a duty to provide assistance. If a physician refuses or is unable
76 Of Life and Death, supra note 5 at "Appendix P: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in Foreign
Jurisdictions," online: <http:Ilwww.parl.gc.cal35l2lparlbuslchambus/senate/com-e/euth-e/rep-ellad-
a3-e.htm#p> (date accessed: 14 May 2001); "Fundamental Justice," supra note 54 at 239.
7 7 Death with Dignity Act, Ore. Stat. §127.800-127.897 (1994), online: Oregon Health Division
<http:/www.ohd.hr.state.or.us/chs/pas/ors.htm> (date accessed: 16 May 2001) [hereinafter DDA].
78 Oregon Health Division, "Oregon's Death with Dignity Act" (1994), online: Oregon Health
Division <http:llwww.ohd.hr.state.or.us/chslpaslpas.htm> (date accessed: 16 May 2001).
79 Ibid.
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to fulfil the patient's request and the patient changes providers, then the
physician must deliver a copy of the patient's medical records to the new
provider. Additionally, the DDA explicitly states that it does not authorize
active euthanasia or mercy killing.80 In 1998, sixteen people and in 1999,
twenty-seven people, ended their lives pursuant to the DDA. 81
The American Medical Association (AMA) has approved of the
withholding and withdrawing of treatment in certain circumstances.8 2
Furthermore, the AMA has unequivocally endorsed the practice of
administering pain-medication to the terminally ill despite its
life-shortening effect.83 Nonetheless, the AMA has consistently opposed
active euthanasia.8 4 With regard to physician-assisted suicide, the AMA
stated that it "is fundamentally incompatible with the physician's role as
healer."85 However, a national survey of physicians conducted in 1996
revealed that, of 1902 respondents, 11 per cent indicated "that under
current legal constraints, there are circumstances in which they would
prescribe a medication for a competent patient to use with the primary
intention of ending his or her life: 36 per cent... said they would
prescribe a medication if it were legal to do so."86 Similarly, under
present legal constraints, 7 per cent stated that they could envision
circumstances involving a competent patient in which they would be
,willing to administer a lethal injection; 24 per cent would be willing to do
so if it were legal.8 7 The findings of a study conducted in Oregon in 1999
showed that, of the 144 respondents who received requests for lethal
prescriptions, 51 per cent were willing to prescribe the medication, 37
per cent were not, and 12 per cent were uncertain.88 With regard to
public opinion, Gallup Poll results reveal that support for the
legalization of voluntary euthanasia has grown from 37 per cent in
80 DDA, supra note 77, §127.880, s. 3.14.
81 A.D. Sullivan, K. Hedberg & D.W. Fleming, "Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in
Oregon - The Second Year" (2000) 342 New Eng. J. Med. 598 at 598 [hereinafter "Suicide in
Oregon"].
82 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 305.
83 Glucksberg, supra note 72 at 750-51.
84 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 305.
85 Glucksberg, supra note 72 at 731.
86 D.E. Meier et aL, "A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
United States" (1998) 338 New Eng. J. Med. 1193 at 1195.
8 7 1bid
88 L. Ganzini et aL, "Physicians' Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act" (2000)
342 New Eng. J. Med. 557 at 559.
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194789 to 75 per cent in 1996.90 In 1994, a Harris Poll disclosed that 73
per cent of those polled approved of physician-assisted suicide.91 Once
again, the medical community's official stance on both procedures does
not mesh well with physician and public opinion.
C. The Netherlands
Euthanasia and assisted suicide are prohibited under the Dutch
Penal Code92 pursuant to the articles relating to murder, manslaughter,
and inciting or assisting suicide. In contrast to Canadian law, the Penal
Code does not provide for mandatory minimum penalties,93 the consent
of the person killed mitigates the crime, 94 and assisting suicide is only
punishable when a suicide actually ensues.9 5 Furthermore, a person
avoids criminal liability when the offence was committed as a result of a
force majeure (overmacht).96 Notwithstanding the official illegality of
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, both practices are legally
permitted. The Dutch courts, in conjunction with the medical
establishment, have developed the policy relating to voluntary
euthanasia and assisted suicide.97 The legitimacy of both practices is
grounded in the principles of autonomy and beneficence. 98
89 Voluntary Euthanasia Society, "USA," online: Voluntary Euthanasia Society <http://
www.ves.org.uk/DpFSUSA.html> (date accessed: 11 May 2001).
90 Voluntary Euthanasia Society, "Public Opinion," online: Voluntary Euthanasia Society
<http://www.ves.org.uk/DpFSPubOp.html> (date accessed: 11 May 2001).
91 "Whose Decision," supra note 62 at 122.
92 The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes: The Dutch Penal Code, trans. L. Rayar & S.
Wadsworth, intro. G. van den Heuvel & H. Lensing (Littleton, Colo.: Rothman, 1997), Art. 289,
287, 294 [hereinafter Penal Code].
93 Ibid., Art. 287,289,293,294.
94 Ibid, Art. 293.
95 Ibi., Art. 294. For a more detailed comparison of the law in Canada and the Netherlands,
see: B. Sneiderman & Marija Verhoef, "Patient Autonomy and the Defence of Medical Necessity:
Five Dutch Euthanasia Cases" (1996) 34 Alta. L. Rev. 374 [hereinafter "Patient Autonomy"].
9 6 Penal Code, ibid., Art. 40.
97 For an in-depth look into the development of euthanasia and assisted suicide policy in the
Netherlands via jurisprudence and the recommendations of the Committee of the Royal Dutch
Medical Association, see: "Patient Autonomy," supra note 95 at 385-407; J. Griffiths, A. Bood & H.
Wcyers, Euthanasia and Law in the Netherlands (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1998) at
83-4,118-27,341-51 [hereinafter Euthanasia and Law].
9 8 Euthanasia and Law, ibi. at 97, 172-74; and "Patient Autonomy," ibid. at 393-96, 407-14.
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In 1993, the law governing the disposal of corpses was amended.
New forms regarding the death of patients were introduced. The form
relating to voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide outlined various
points requiring attention by the reporting physician. In essence, the
elements corresponded to the requirements of "careful practice"
(outlined below) delineated in the case law. The amendment did not
affect the legality of either practice.99 Today, both practices are
permitted if certain conditions are met. The substantive requirements
dictate that a patient make an explicit request that is voluntary, well
considered, and enduring. The patient must be suffering unbearably and
hopelessly. The suffering need not have "a somatic basis and in such a
case there must be no realistic prospect of treatment. If the suffering is
somatically based, then other possibilities for relieving the distress or
treating the condition must have been exhausted or refused by the
patient. Only physicians can legally perform euthanasia. With regard to
the procedural requirements (requirements of careful practice), a doctor
must formally confer with at least one other physician as to the patient's
condition, prognosis, and the alternatives available. A written record of
the matter should be kept and the procedure should be performed in a
professionally responsible manner. The physician should remain with the
patient or be readily available until death. Instances of euthanasia
cannot be reported as natural deaths.lOO Physicians are obligated to
notify the authorities, but prosecutions do not result if the guidelines are
adhered to. The physician's actions are evaluated by a regional review
committee whose final opinion is submitted to the Public Prosecutions
Service and has much bearing on whether a prosecution will proceed.101
The current situation in the Netherlands seems to sit well with
the Dutch population. A 1991 survey conducted by the Social and
Cultural Planning Office revealed that 57 per cent of respondents were
in favour of a doctor administering a lethal injection in order to relieve
the suffering of a patient at her/his explicit request, 32 per cent said it
depends, 3 per cent were unsure, and 9 per cent were opposed.102 A
9 9 Euthanasia and Law, ibid at 79-80.
1 00 Ibid. at 100-106.
101 Minister of Justice of The Netherlands, "Bill for 'Review of Cases of Termination of Life
on Request and Assistance with Suicide' Sent to the Lower House of Parliament" (1999), online:
Department of Justice <http:llwww.minjust.nl:8080/aBELEID/fact/euthanasia.htm> (date
accessed: 15 May 2001) [hereinafter "Review of Cases"].
102 P.J. van der Maas, L. Pijnenborg & J.J.M. van Delden, "Changes in Dutch Opinions on
Active Euthanasia, 1966 Through 1991" (1995) 273 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1411 at 1413 [hereinafter
"Changes in Dutch Opinions"]. It is assumed that the totals in 1991 are rounded since the total
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more recent university study claims that 92 per cent of the population
supports euthanasia.103 Similar support can be found in the political
realm. In 1993, the positive responses of all three major political parties
(the Liberals, the Social-Democrats, and the Christian-Democrats) to
the following question were overwhelming: "Do you feel that someone
who is, for him- or herself, in an unacceptable and hopeless situation,
always has the right to request a termination of his/her own life?"1 04
Over the years, a number of legislative proposals have been
made in an attempt to codify voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide
policy. They failed, not because there was a lack of majority support, but
because of the needs of placating the Christian-Democrats to ensure the
survival of coalition governments. 05 Since 1951, nearly all coalitions
have included the Christian-Democrats.106 However, in 2000, that
changed; the Christian-Democrats were not part of the government.' 07
On 28 November 2000, the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament
approved a bill that will remove voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide from the sphere of the criminal law.l0 8 Provisions will be added
to articles 293 and 294 of the Penal Code that absolve physicians of
liability.'0 9 Sixty-six per cent of the 362 Dutch physicians surveyed in
1991 favoured similar amendments." 0 The physician must fulfil the
requirements of due care provided for in a new act: the Termination of
exceeds 100 per cent.
103 R. Janssen, "Government Supports Euthanasia Law" (1999) 390 Europe 41.
104 D.J. Hessing, J.R. Blad & R. Pieterman, "Practical Reasons and Reasonable Practice: The
Case of Euthanasia in The Netherlands" (1996) J. Soc. Issues 149 at 163-64 [hereinafter "Practical
Reasons"]. The Liberals replied 95.4 per cent yes, 3.8 per cent don't know, and 0.8 per cent no. The
corresponding data for the Social-Democrats was 86 per cent, 10.3 per cent and 3.7 per cent. The
Christian-Democrat response was 66.3 per cent, 16.7 per cent and 17.1 per cent, respectively.
105 Euthanasia and Law, supra note 97 at 85.
106 "Practical Reasons," supra note 104 at 162.
107 "Review of Cases," supra note 101.
108 The vote was 104-40: "Legalizing Euthanasia in the Netherlands" Maclean's (11 December
2000), online: LEXIS-NEXIS (news, 90 DAYS); and Minister of Justice of The Netherlands,
"Review of Cases of Termination of Life on Request and Assistance with Suicide: Bill Passed in
Parliament" (2000), online: Department of Justice
<http://www.minjust.nl:8080/c-actual/persber/pbO668.htm> (date accessed: 28 May 2001)
[hereinafter "Bill Passed"].
10 9 Ibid.; and "Review of Cases," supra note 101.
110 "Special Issue," supra note 6 at 103. An additional 20 per cent thought voluntary
euthanasia should remain punishable in principle but not when the rules of due care were adhered
to. Seven per cent opined that voluntary euthanasia was never punishable. One per cent thought it
should always be punished.
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Life on Request and Assistance with Suicide (Review) Act.1U1 Physicians
must also report their actions to the municipal coroner. The new
legislation will not substantively change the present due care
requirements. It recognizes the validity of euthanasia declarations
(advance directives). Physicians can act on the directive unless they have
good reason not to. Persons as young as sixteen years old can request
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide as long as their parents
participate in the decisionmaking process. Children between the ages of
twelve and sixteen can also request the procedures, but the consent of
their parents or guardians is required. Review committees will continue
to conduct investigations, but only have to refer cases to the prosecutor
when they deem it necessary to do so. 112 The legislation received the
support of the Social-Democratic, Liberal-Democratic, and Liberal
coalition government, but was opposed by three small right-wing
religious parties and the Christian-Democratic Party.1)3 On 10 April
2001, the Dutch Senate passed the bill and it is anticipated that it will go
into force in autumn 2001.114
V. NORMATIVE JUSTIFICATION OF VOLUNTARY
EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE IN CANADA
A number of positions have been advanced in favour of, and in
opposition to, the legalization of voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide. Some of the more compelling arguments will be examined in
detail below with particular attention being paid to the Canadian
situation.
A. The Rodriguez "Consensus"
The majority in Rodriguez115 interpreted such things as the
prohibition of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in foreign
jurisdictions and the official positions of medical associations as
111 "Review of Cases," supra note 101; and "Bill Passed," supra note 108.
112 "Review of Cases," ibid.
113 Janssen, supra note 103.
1147Te vote was 46-28: Minister of Justice of The Netherlands, "Bill for Testing Requests for
Euthanasia and Help with Suicide Passed by Dutch Parliament" (2001), online: Department of
Justice <http://www.minijust.n:80e0/C.actual/persber/pbO715.htm> (date accessed: 28 May 2001).
115 Rodriguez, supra note 26.
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evidence that there is a consensus that the practices should not be
permitted.116 This approach is problematic for various reasons. The
weight to be given to an alleged consensus when formulating or
amending public policy and the law should be cautiously assessed.1 17 As
well, the courts should not use the purported consensus in foreign
jurisdictions to define the extent to which the rights of Canadians are
protected by the Charter.118 Instead, if consensus is to be utilized, then it
should be informed by the Canadian experience.119 If one examines the
results of the public and physician opinion polls listed above, then the
consensus arrived at in Rodriguez is anything but accurate. Rather,
sentiment appears to significantly favour law reform. Moreover, the
recent legislative development in Oregon throws the entire "prohibition-
therefore-consensus" argument into question. However, a consensus
alone does not necessarily justify permitting voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide. The Charter protects the rights and freedoms of all
Canadians (minorities included)120 and a consensus is merely one factor
that needs to be taken into account.
B. Killing Versus Letting Die
There has been much controversy surrounding the distinction
between "killing" and "letting die." Roughly, the argument for
maintaining the distinction is as follows: withdrawing or withholding life-
sustaining treatment constitutes an omission, not a positive act; death is
caused by the underlying disease, not by the omission nor by the
administration of a lethal substance; thus, the doctor does not kill, but
lets the patient die. 121 As a result, culpability differs. Each claim will be
dealt with in turn.
Withholding treatment is obviously an omission and Lord
116 Ibid. at 601-608, 612-15.
117 E.W. Keyserlingk, "Assisted Suicide, Causality and the Supreme Court of Canada (Case
Comment)" (1994) 39 McGill L. 708 at 715.
118 "Fundamental Justice," supra note 54 at 250-51.
119 Ibid.
120 See, for example, the provisions pertaining to fundamental freedoms, equality rights, and
minority language educational rights in Charter, supra note 29, ss. 2, 15, 23.
121 B. Sneiderman, "The Case of Nancy B: A Criminal Law and Social Policy Perspective"
(1993) 1 Health L.J. 25 at 28-29 [hereinafter "The Case of Nancy B"].
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Browne-Wilkinson inAiredale,122 articulated why withdrawing treatment
can also be classified as such:
The positive act of removing the nasogastric tube presents more difficulty. It is
undoubtedly a positive act, similar to switching off a ventilator in the case of a patient
whose life is being sustained by artificial ventilation. But in my judgement in neither case
should the act be classified as positive, since to do so would be to introduce intolerably
fine distinctions. If, instead of removing the nasogastric tube, it was left in place but no
further nutrients were provided for the tube to convey to the patient's stomach, that
would not be an act of commission. Again, as has been pointed out ... if the switching off
of a ventilator were to be classified as a positive act, exactly the same result can be
achieved by installing a time-clock which requires to be reset every 12 hours: the failure
to reset the machine could not be classified as a positive act.
This line of reasoning reflects the difficulties in reconciling the
acts/omissions doctrine with acceptable medical practice. Yet, if one
concedes that, in some circumstances, withdrawing treatment should be
classified as an omission, then the procedure can be distinguished from
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide since these practices involve
positive acts.
It has been asserted that the cause of death when treatment is
withheld or withdrawn is the underlying disease; nature simply takes its
course.1 23 It is hard to envision though, that withdrawing life-sustaining
treatment does not fall within the ambit of legal causation, especially
when the withdrawal is contrary to the patient's wishes.124 Legal
causality in this area is based on policy considerations: whether consent
has been given, whether treatment is futile,12S and who is withdrawing
the treatment. Nonetheless, voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide do
involve the administration of substances that undoubtedly cause death.
Additionally, it can be argued that the act of giving a lethal substance to
a patient invokes different feelings on behalf of the facilitator.1 26
Intent can also serve to differentiate other end-of-life decisions
122Airedale N.H.S. Trust v. Bland, [1993] A.C. 789 at 881-82 [hereinafter Bland]. Another case
considered and distinguished Bland on the grounds that an invasive surgical procedure to separate
conjoined twins could not accurately be classified as an omission: Re A (children) (conjoined twins:
suricalseparation), [2000] 4 All E.R. 961 (C.A.).
123 See, for example, Nancy B., supra note 24; and N. Cantor & G.C. Thomas III, "The Legal
Bounds of Physician Conduct Hastening Death" (2000) 48 Buff. L. Rev. 83 at 153 [hereinafter
"Legal Bounds"].
124A. Fish & P.A. Singer, "Nancy B.: The Criminal Code and Decisions to Forgo Life-Sustaining
Treatment" (1992) 147 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 637 at 639.
125 Keyserlingk, supra note 117 at 712.
126 M.A. Somerville, "'Death Talk' in Canada: The Rodriguez Case (Case Comment)" (1994)
39 McGill L.i. 602 at 612-13.
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from voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide; that is, with regard to the
latter procedures, the primary intent of the facilitator is to kill.127 In
Rodriguez, Justice Sopinka reiterated that such distinctions form the
basis of Canadian criminal law.128 However, other end-of-life decisions
also involve subjective foresight of death and a person should not simply
avoid responsibility by turning one's attention to one effect as opposed
to another.1 29
Do the above distinctions serve to isolate voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide from other end-of-life decisions and as a result,
justify prohibition? The matter is further obscured when one considers
common medical practice regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment in Canada. In a case involving the withdrawal of a respirator,
the Qu6bec Superior Court permitted the physician to ask the hospital
for any "necessary assistance" in such circumstances "so that everything
can take place in a manner respecting the dignity of the plaintiff."130 In a
medical disciplinary hearing in Ontario in 1995, the committee heard
testimony from three expert witnesses:
They testified that, once the decision is made to withdraw life-support by removing the
intra-tracheal tube, it is the attending physician's duty to do everything necessary to keep
the patient comfortable and prevent suffering. Morphine is the drug of choice and should
be given in doses to relieve feelings of suffocation and anxiety that would otherwise occur
... the physician should err on the side of giving too much rather than not enough, to
ensure that this goal is reached...whether morphine administration hastens death while
relieving suffering, in a situation where death is imminent and inevitable, is
immaterial. 131
The contrast between killing and letting die is far from being
crystal clear. All of the aforementioned end-of-life decisions involve the
inevitable death of the patient and the facilitator's subjective foresight of
that outcome. Moreover, many of the distinctions are circumstantially
dependent. For example, withdrawing treatment would certainly be
classified as a positive act if it were not consensual and involved a
malefactor. Additionally, legal causation in the context of withdrawing
treatment is contingent upon consent. If a dying patient had the
potential to live for quite some time, desired to do so, and a physician
withdrew life-sustaining treatment despite the patient's wishes, then
12 7Ibid
128 Rodriguez, supra note 26 at 607.
129 Singer, supra note 2 at 209-10.
130 Nancy B.,supra note 24 at 395.
131 Re de la Rocha, [1995] O.C.P.S.D. No. 6 at para. 29, online: QL (OCPS) [hereinafter de la
Rocha].
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surely the underlying disease could not be held out to be the legal cause
of death. As well, the feelings invoked on behalf of a facilitator that
administers a lethal substance need not be interpreted in a negative
manner; facilitators should perceive their actions as providing
appropriate care for their patients.
Although it is possible to maintain certain distinctions between
voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide and other end-of-life decisions
in some situations, the above discussion supports the contention that the
procedures differ in degree and not in kind. Furthermore, such
differences are not determinative of whether prohibition is warranted.
Justice McLachlin (as she was then), dissenting, in Rodriguez, held that if
a justification is established, it does not matter whether the assistance to
end life is passive (withdrawing treatment) or active (providing the
necessary means).132 It is necessary to look elsewhere in order to decide
whether the prohibition of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide can
be justified.
C. The Sanctity of Life
It is commonly argued that human life is sacred and
inalienable.1 33 The majority in Rodriguez accepted this proposition.134
Human life is well protected under Canadian law and there is little
doubt that its value should be enthusiastically revered. However, the
strength of the argument needs to be evaluated. As previously indicated,
Canadians are free to terminate their own lives if they so wish. With
regard to the killing of others, Justice Sopinka, in Rodriguez, asserted
that participating in the death of another is inherently "morally and
legally wrong."135 However, Justice McLachlin stated that people are not
necessarily criminally sanctioned when their omissions result in another's
death. Those under a legal obligation to provide the necessaries of life
are not criminally liable when a lawful excuse is established, such as the
incapacity to provide or the consent of the person who dies. A person
who kills in self-defence is not culpable either. Thus, the legal rule that
killing is wrong is not absolute. Culpability is dependent upon the
132 Rodriguez, supra note 26 at 624.
133 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 21.
134 Rodriguez, supra note 26 at 595-96.
135 Ibid. at 601.
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circumstances and whether a valid justification can be made out.136 As
far as morality is concerned, it can be argued that causing a person's
death is morally wrong when it is unauthorized, unjustified, and deprives
a person of benefits that would otherwise have been afforded. No moral
wrong exists when these elements are absent.137 As a result, the
contention that killing is inherently wrong is highly debatable.
The "sanctity of life" argument is further called into question
when one considers that Canadians can refuse life-sustaining treatment
and have it withdrawn. Doctors can also withhold futile treatment and
the administration of palliative care that has the effect of shortening life
is medically accepted practice in Canada. Moreover, the argument
cannot be viewed in the abstract. Life must be valuable to someone or
for something: "[t]he sanctity of life is acknowledged to be of
overwhelming value to society when chosen, but its value in the
particular case is not so clearly seen when it offers only suffering."138
The "sanctity of life" argument is by no means devoid of merit, but it
does not serve as an adequate justification for the continued prohibition
of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide.
D. The Right to Die?
There may or may not be a "right" to die in Canada. As it stands,
a person can, without fear of criminal punishment, express one's
autonomy and end her or his life. There has not been a push for the
re-criminalization of suicide in Canada. People also have much control
over other end-of-life decisions. Thus, Canadians apparently accept that
the notion of autonomy or personal choice extends to self-destructive
behaviour.13 9 Whether a general "right to die" exists and just what that
entails (a positive or negative right) is open to debate. Regardless, it is
not necessary to find such a right in order to justify voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide.
136 Ibid. at 623-24.
13 7 T.L. Beauchamp, "The Medical Ethics of Physician-Assisted Suicide" (1999) 25 J. Med.
Ethics 437 at 438.
138 G. DuVal, "Assisted Suicide and the Notion of Autonomy" (1995) 27 Ottawa L. Rev. 1 at
13.
139 IbiL at 12.
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E. The Integity of the Medical Profession
As mentioned above, the American Medical Association
considers assisted suicide to be at odds with the traditional role of the
physician as "healer" and the state has an interest in protecting the
honour of the medical profession.1 40 Additionally, it is argued that
allowing physician-assisted suicide "would desensitize doctors to killing,
destroy physicians' moral credibility, subvert society's faith in physicians
and generally make life more difficult for physicians whether they agree
or refuse to assist." 141 However, Justice Stevens, in Glucksberg,
acknowledged that a physician's refusal to administer medication that
renders death dignified and tolerable could contradict the physician's
role as healer.1 42 The dying patient may view a physician's refusal to
hasten death as a rejection, abandonment, or a declaration of
inappropriate paternalistic authority. Complying with a patient's request
for physician-assisted suicide would not harm the doctor-patient
relationship. Moreover, there is already tension between the traditional
role of physicians and contemporary reality; doctors engage in practices
that shorten life, such as withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining
treatment and terminal sedation.143 The "medical integrity" objection
and the concerns above should also apply to these practices. 4 4 Yet, as
previously mentioned, these practices have been accepted in Canada to
the extent that there has been a push to recognize the legality of these
common medical procedures through legislation. 145 Furthermore,
palliative care in Canada has recently been at the forefront of political
discussion. The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science
and Technology, following up on the 1995 Senate report on euthanasia
and assisted suicide, concluded, among other things, that: "Each person
is entitled to die in relative comfort, as free as possible from physical,
emotional, psychosocial, and spiritual distress. Each Canadian is entitled
to access skilled, compassionate, and respectful care at the end of
140 Glucksberg, supra note 72 at 731, 748-94.
141 DuVal, supra note 138 at 16.
142 Glucksberg, supra note 72 at 748-49.
143 Ibid.
14 4 DuVal, supra note 138 at 16.
145 Bill S-2, supra note 44.
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life."146 Consistent with this view, there comes a time in the
doctor-patient relationship when the physician's role is no longer
curative, but transforms into one that involves comforting.147 Death is an
inevitable part of life and medical care should address the event
appropriately. The basic ethical principles espoused by the Canadian
Medical Association (cMA) provide for compassionate end-of-life care.
The CMA's Code of Ethics does not explicitly mention euthanasia or
assisted suicide, but "has traditionally been interpreted as opposing these
practices." 148 The continued prohibition of voluntary euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide on the grounds that there is a need to protect
the medical profession's integrity is not persuasive.
F. Quality Palliative Care is not the Solution
It can be argued that adequate palliative care can reduce or
eliminate requests for euthanasia and assisted suicide. According to
some, the lack of palliative care services underscores the push for
assisted suicide in Canada. 149 In some cases, palliative care may inhibit
or end one's desire to die. However, this is not true in all cases. For
example, Justice Stevens, in Glucksberg, referred to gources that assert
that such care is not always effective because pain becomes more
difficult to treat as death draws near.1 50 Additionally, inadequate pain
management is not necessarily the prime concern of dying patients. A
study of the characteristics of those that died under Oregon's DDA in
1998 and 1999 revealed that patients were very much concerned about
146 Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Quality
End-of-Life Care" The Right of Every Canadian (2000) at "The Subcommittee's Conclusions," online:
Government of Canada
<http:/www.parl.gc.ca36/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/upda-e/rep-e/repfinjunOO-e.htm> (date
accessed: 16 May 2001) [hereinafter End-of-Life Care].
14 7 N. Testa, "Sentenced to Life? An Analysis of the United States Supreme Court's Decision
in Washington v. Glucksberg" (1998) 22 Nova L. Rev. 821 at 850.
148 Canadian Medical Association, "Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (update 1998)" (1998),
online: Canadian Medical Association <http://www.cma.ca/inside/policybasel1998/06-19f.htm>
(date accessed: 16 May 2001) [hereinafter "Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide"] [emphasis added].
149 CBC Staff, "Senate Releases Report on Quality of Care for Dying" CBC News (7 June
2000), online: CBC News
<http:/Avww.cbc.ca/Cgi-bin/tempates/view.cgi?news2000I06/05/pal iative000605> (date accessed:
16 May 2001).
150 Glucksberg, supra note 72 at 747-48.
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end-of-life issues unrelated to pain.151 Furthermore, a Canadian study of
126 patients indicated that they were most anxious about the following:
avoiding inappropriate prolongation of dying (61.1 per cent),
strengthening relationships with loved ones (38.9 per cent), achieving a
sense of control (38.1 per cent), relieving burden (38.1 per cent),
receiving adequate symptom and pain management (22.2 per cent). 152
There is often more behind a request for death than the
alleviation of pain. Admittedly, palliative care encompasses more than
just pain control and can be of assistance in other areas that might
influence an end-of-life decision. But this does not directly challenge the
permissibility of voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide; these practices
are independently justifiable. Palliative care, and voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide, can be conceptualized as legitimate alternatives on
the health care continuum, not as dichotomies.153 Comprehensive care
for the dying should be adopted in Canada.
G. Autonomy and Beneficence
The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment or have it withdrawn
in Canada is premised on the notion of autonomy. The Standing Senate
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology stated that, in
general, the principles of autonomy, beneficence, and justice guide
ethical discussions concerning end-of-life care:
Autonomy generally encompasses self-determination, personal liberty and freedom of
choice. Justice refers to the overall question of fairness, of equitable distribution of scarce
resources. Beneficence seeks to ensure that any intervention is for the benefit of the
patient and not for experimental, economic, or other reasons. The trend is away from an
ethic of prolonging life at all costs and toward an ethic that emphasizes the quality of life
and of dying. 154
151 "Suicide in Oregon," supra note 81 at 603: While the families of nineteen patients
indicated that physical suffering was quite a concern to those dying (53 per cent), the physicians of
all forty-three patients identified the following concerns; burden on family, friends, or other
care-givers (21 per cent); loss of autonomy (79 per cent); inability to participate in enjoyable
activities (77 per cent); losing control over bodily functions (58 per cent); inadequate pain control
(21 per cent).
152 P.A. Singer, D.K. Martin & M. Kelner, "Quality End-of-Life Care: Patients' Perspectives"
(1999) 281 J. Amer. Med. Ass'n 163 at 165.
153 M.G. Young & R.D. Ogden, "The Role of Nurses in AIDS Care Regarding Voluntary
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: A Call for Further Dialogue" (2000) 31 J. Advanced Nursing 513
at 517.
154 End-of-Life Care, supra note 146 at Part I.
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The principles of autonomy (explicitly mentioned) and
beneficence (implicit in the discussions involving suffering) were
extensively examined in the Rodriguez decision and, according to the
dissent, justified assistance in dying.1S5 Additionally, beneficence and
autonomy underscore the CMA'S code of ethics.' 56 These principles are
the driving force behind the push for palliative care in Canada and, when
taken together, can justify voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide as
well. When people make voluntary and informed decisions that
continuing life is not to their benefit, they should be free (with
qualification) to seek assistance so that they can end their lives in a
compassionate and acceptable manner. However, there are some
objections to this assertion.
There is some concern that permitting "death with dignity" will
spread the message that disabled life is not worth living.157 But the same
criticism can be levelled against the practice of withdrawing and
withholding of life-sustaining treatment, yet the total devaluation of
disabled lives has not resulted. Most severely disabled persons do not
consider themselves as being "better off dead." However, commitment
to autonomy demands that such persons' wishes be respected whether
they decide to live or reject treatment. 158 If a disabled person desires
death, is not receiving life-sustaining treatment, and is unable to take
his/her own life, then the principles of autonomy and beneficence
support permitting voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide in such a
case. A fear of what might occur in the future should not override
individual choices to end suffering in the present.
Various attempts have also been made to undermine the notion
that autonomous decisionmaking is possible in the "terminally ill"
context. First, there is concern that treatable depression is related to the
desire to die in terminally ill patients and that proper treatment can
reverse such feelings.159 Recognizing and treating endogenous
155 Rodriguez, supra note 26.
156 "Euthanasia and Assisted suicide," supra note 148.
157 C. Mwaria, "Physician-Assisted Suicide: An Anthropological Perspective" (1997) 24
Fordham Urb. L.J. 859 at 864-85, online: WL (FDMULJ).
158 "The Case of Nancy B," supra note 121 at 37-38.
159 j. Belian, "Deference to Doctors in Dutch Euthanasia Law" (1996) 10 Emory Int'l L Rev.
255 at 285, online: WL (EMORYILR); and H. Hendin, "Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients, and
the Dutch Cure" (1994) 10 Issues L. & Med. 123 at 164, online: WL (ISSULM) [hereinafter
"Seduced by Death"].
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depression is an ongoing problem for medical practitioners. 1 60 Although
depression is not uniformly present in dying patients, it has been argued
that severe depression casts serious doubt on whether an individual's
request is well-reasoned, because depression "is an intrinsic part of the
disease."1 61 However, not all depressive conditions affect the
decisionmaking process.162 As a result, autonomy is not necessarily
undermined.
Second, it has been contended that some psychologists are not
qualified to conduct mental competency assessments, that the degree of
confidence based on single evaluations is very low, and that these
limitations may adversely affect free choice.1 63 Nonetheless, such
assessments are made daily, in a variety of important contexts, and their
validity is not seriously questioned. Furthermore, this objection, as well
as the first, does not directly challenge the notion of autonomous
decisionmaking. Rather, it highlights the need for legislative
safeguarding to reasonably ensure that autonomous decisionmaking will
be realized.1 64
Third, it has been argued that autonomous decisionmaking that
is "fully informed, non-coerced ... in rational furtherance of one's own
goals, is an ideal which is never fully realized."165 For this reason, even
voluntary euthanasia should not be permitted. The stylized argument for
this conclusion is as follows: decisions are always subject to external
influences. Due to the extreme circumstances, the autonomy of an
incurably or terminally ill patient is seriously compromised. In such
cases, the person desiring death may be making a terrible mistake. There
are no satisfactory means of identifying these cases. Therefore, an
absolute prohibition on assisted suicide is justified in order to prevent
disregarding a person's "authentic autonomy."16 6 Implicit in the
argument is the premise that terminally ill individuals who exercise a
160 p. Baume, "Voluntary Euthanasia: Reponses of Medical Practitioners in NSW and the Act
to Six Open-Ended Questions" (1998) 22 Austl. & N.Z. J. Pub. Health 269, online: Gerstein Science
Information Centre at the University of Toronto, e-journals (date accessed: 24 May 2001).
161 D.K. Gittelman, "Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide" (1999) 92 S. Med. J. 369 at
371.
162 M.A. Drickamer, M.A. Lee & L. Ganzini, "Practical Issues in Physician-Assisted Suicide"
(1997) 126 Annals of Internal Medicine 146 at 147.
163 M. Larkin, "Psychologists Grapple with Patient Requests to Hasten Death" (1999) 353
Lancet 2133.
164 Singer, supra note 2 at 196-97.
165 DuVal, supra note 138 at 20.
166 Ibid. at 20-22, 29, 30-31.
[VOL. 38 No. 4
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
reasonable degree of autonomy do not generally request death. Thus, a
request is evidence of a lack of autonomy and assistance should not be
given. The argument also requires one to accept that totally autonomous
decisions cannot be made, especially by the terminally ill. As a result,
any argument from autonomy that advocates voluntary euthanasia or
assisted suicide for the terminally ill automatically fails. However,
decisions are always made within a context and the fact that they are
made in difficult circumstances does not render them non-autonomous.
The dismissal of terminally ill patients' autonomous decisionmaking
ability in the above manner is paternalistic. Moreover, autonomous
capacity is not generally an issue in the context of refusing or
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment and it should not be questioned
simply because a person is asking for assistance in dying. Furthermore
and again, this argument emphasizes the need for caution in drafting
legislation that protects against abuse and does little to undermine the
notion of autonomy. With the above discussion in mind, the combined
principles of autonomy and beneficence provide the foundation
necessary to support the permissibility of voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide in Canada.
H. Slippery Slopes
By far, the most common argument used to oppose voluntary
euthanasia and assisted suicide takes the form of the slippery slope.
Slippery slope arguments usually entail that an alleged action, although
acceptable in the circumstances, would set off a disastrous set of
subsequent events. Thus, the initial step should not be taken.1 67 These
types of arguments present analytical difficulties in the voluntary
euthanasia and assisted suicide context because: "[t]hey involve
essentially factual claims being made about ... probable or possible
consequences ... [b]oth the prediction and its denial are
speculative-not satisfactorily provable of refutable." 168 Nevertheless,
the arguments cannot be taken lightly due to the seriousness of the
allegations.
It has been argued that permitting voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide could lead to an increase in the prevalence of the
167 See, for example, T. Govier, A Practical Study of Argument, 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth, 1988) at 388.
168 DuVal, supra note 138 at 15.
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practices.169 This may or may not be the case. After all, most people
cherish life and fight to survive. Increased medical technology and better
end-of-life care should also help prevent the practices from reaching
epidemic proportions. But even if the incidents of voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide were to increase, that would not necessarily be an
unfavourable outcome. The practice of voluntary euthanasia may be
more humane than other permissible end-of-life procedures as it can
lead to less suffering.170
Permitting voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide could also
lead to abuses.1 71 For example, the vulnerable could be coerced into
asking for the procedures. The Ontario Law Reform Commission
employed this reasoning to justify assisted suicide but not voluntary
euthanasia. The Commission stated that active participation negates
much of the potential for abuse that could occur when someone else
administers a lethal substancej 72 This argument is unconvincing. It is
not difficult to imagine a situation where a person has been persuaded to
ask for assisted suicide. More importantly, the same criticism can be
levelled against the practices of withholding, withdrawing, and refusing
life-sustaining treatment.1 73 It can be argued that these practices are
even more susceptible to abuse in light of advance directive legislation
and proxy decisionmaking ability, yet, there has not been a push to
prohibit these practices. The assertion that abuses, such as the coercion
of the vulnerable, might occur if voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide are permitted stresses the need for enacting stringent legislative
safeguards, not maintaining a blanket prohibition.
It has additionally been alleged that permitting the practices
could lead to non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.1 74 These latter
forms of euthanasia categorically differ from voluntary euthanasia in
that they do not involve voluntariness and explicit requests. Thus, in the
logical sense, the argument fails. Nonetheless, the argument is
continually made and those opposed to voluntary euthanasia and
169 Rodriguez, supra note 26 at 581-601; "Fundamental Justice," supra note 54 at 251-52.
170 J. Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia" in M. Velasquez & C. Rostankowski, eds.,
Ethics: Theory and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985) 285 at 286.
171 Rodriguez, supra note 26 at 581-601; "Fundamental Justice," supra note 54 at 251-52.
172 Gilmour, supra note 42 at 258.
173 D. Gorman, "Active and Passive Euthanasia: The Cases of Drs. Claudio Alberto de ]a
Rocha and Nancy Morrison" (1999) 160 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 857 at 860.
174 J. Keown, "Euthanasia in The Netherlands: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope?" (1995) 9
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 407, online: WL (NTDJLEPP); "Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide," supra note 148; and Rodriguez, supra note 26 at 581-601.
[VOL. 38 No. 4
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide
assisted suicide point to the situation in the Netherlands for evidence
that this slide and other abuses have occurred in reality.175 This claim
greatly fortifies the position of those opposed to lifting the prohibition
and is arguably the most significant obstacle that proponents of change
have to face.
I. Summary and Conclusion
The previous discussion lerids support to the following
propositions. First, there is a general sentiment that the laws prohibiting
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada are in need of
change. Second, while it is possible to maintain some distinctions
between voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide and other end-of-life
practices, the procedures differ in degree and not in kind. Third, the
"sanctity of life" is not an absolute value. Patients and physicians
currently have much control over end-of-life matters in Canada. As a
result, the argument that human life is inviolable and inalienable fails to
justify the continued prohibition of voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide. Fourth, the practices do not pose a threat to the medical
profession's integrity. Fifth, comprehensive care for the dying should
include not only palliative care, but also voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide. Sixth, the twin principles of autonomy and beneficence
provide the foundation for permitting the procedures in Canada. Finally,
although slippery slope arguments can generally be dismissed, they do
raise some legitimate concerns. If allowing voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide inevitably leads to non-voluntary or involuntary
euthanasia and/or widespread abuse, then continued prohibition is
warranted; the evidence must be examined.
VI. THE NORMATIVE QUESTION MARK:
THE SLIPPERY SLOPE
Allegations that voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide lead to
non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia as well as other abuses
abound. The goings-on in the Netherlands are used to substantiate such
claims. The validity of these claims will be examined below. The extent
175 See, for example, Keown, ibi at 407-48; Rodriguez, supra note 26 at 603-604; Glucksberg,
supra note 72 at 734-35; and T. Lemmens, "Legalizing Euthanasia" (1995) 2 Can. HIV/AIDS Pol'y
Newsl. 7 at 8-9.
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to which voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide are being practiced,
and whether similar criticisms can be levelled against the state of affairs
in other countries, will also be discussed.
A. The Netherlands
Dutch jurisprudence suggests that the situation in the
Netherlands is far from being trouble-free.1 76 However, the empirical
evidence must be examined in order to provide an accurate account of
the overall situation. Unfortunately, reliable and valid research in the
Netherlands did not exist before 1990.177 In 1991, the state-authorized
Remmelink Commission delivered its national report on euthanasia and
other end-of-life decisions. 178 The Commission conducted three
separate studies and ensured confidentiality. The "physician interview"
(Pi) study entailed in-depth interviews with 405 physicians. The "death
certificate" (DC) study was based on a stratified sample of 7,000 deaths.
The physicians that participated in the PI study answered questionnaires
concerning their actions in the subsequent six months; this was referred
to as the "prospective" study.179 A number of medical decisions
concerning the end-of-life were examined. With regard to euthanasia,
the Commission adopted the definition accepted in the Netherlands:
"the purposeful acting to terminate life by a person other than the
person concerned upon request of the latter."180 Thus, only voluntary
euthanasia is classified as euthanasia in the Netherlands. Assisted
suicide was defined as "the purposeful assisting of the person concerned
to terminate life upon request of the latter."181 Life-terminating acts
' 176 Assistance was given in questionable circumstances and/or in breach of the established
guidelines in the Kors, Duintjerand Chabot cases. For a detailed case analysis see: "Patient
Autonomy," supra note 95 at 393-405. It has been argued that accepting a suicide plea from a
patient with psychiatric problems is simply poor psychiatry: "Seduced by Death," supra note 159 at
164. Technically, the Dutch have also condoned the practice of non-voluntary euthanasia as the
Prins and Kadijk cases did not involve the request of the infants involved. For more details see:
Euthanasia and Law, supra note 97 at 83-84, 341-51; Approximately fifteen severely disabled infants
are euthanized every year in the Netherlands: Euthanasia and Law, supra note 97 at 230.
177Euthanasia and Law, ibid at 202; "Changes in Dutch Opinions," supra note 102.
178 Euthanasia and Law, ibid. at 77-79.
179 "Special Issue," supra note 6 at 13; P.J. van der Maas et aL, "Euthanasia and Other
Medical Decisions Concerning the End of Life" (1991) 338 Lancet 669 at 669-70 [hereinafter
"Other Medical Decisions"].
180 "Special Issue," ibid at 23.
181 Ibid.
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without the patient's explicit request (LAWER) entailed "acts" such as the
administration of drugs (withdrawing treatment not included) and a
non-explicit request (no request at all or vague remarks).18 2 LAWER
includes non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia as defined in this
paper. The results of the PI study were weighted so as to enable
extrapolation.18 3 In 1995, the Pi and DC studies were duplicated.1 84 The
following table offers a detailed comparison of the studies findings:18 5
TABLE 1
The incidence of euthanasia and assisted suicide in the Netherlands*
*percentages are based on total number of deaths in the Netherlands: 128,7'6
(1990); 135,546 (1995), numbers have been rounded; ** VE-voluntary
euthanasia; *** AS- assisted suicide; **** PAS- physician-assisted suicide.
182 L. Pijnenborg et aL, "Life-Terminating Acts Without Explicit Request of Patient" (1993)
341 Lancet 1196 at 1197.
183 "Other Medical Decisions," supra note 179 at 670.
184 p.j. van der Maas et al., "Euthanasia, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical
Practices Involving the End of Life in The Netherlands, 1990-1995" (1996) 335 New Eng. J. Med.
1699 [hereinafter "End of Life in The Netherlands"].
185 Ibid. Based on the figures contained in Table 1.
Phys. Interview (PI) Study
Variable 1990 1995
Explicit requests for 8,900 9,700
VE** or AS***
rE: % of 1.8 (2,300) 2.4 (3,200)
deaths
(number)
PAS****: % of 0.3 (400) 0.4 (500)
deaths
(number)
LAWER: % of no data 0.7 (900)
deaths
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Although a great number of requests for voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide are made, relatively few are granted. It is generally
agreed upon that the best estimates for voluntary euthanasia equalled
1.8 per cent (2,300) and 2.4 per cent (3,200) in 1990 and 1995,
respectively. For both years, the agreed upon total for assisted suicide is
0.3 per cent (400). With regard to LAWER, the figure for 1990 is 0.8 per
cent (1,000) and 0.7 per cent (900) for 1995.186 However,
commentators18 7 rightly point out that opioids given with the intention
to end life (not included in the above analysis) should be added to the
number of deaths that occurred without an explicit request: 1 per cent
(1,300) in 1990; 1.4 per cent (1,900) in 1995. Thus, estimated deaths
caused by active physician intervention total 5,000 (3.9 per cent) in 1990
and 6,400 (4.7 per cent) in 1995.
' In the 1990 study, 54 per cent of physicians indicated that they
had performed voluntary euthanasia or assisted suicide at some time and
34 per cent had not but could conceive of doing so.188 In 1995, the
corresponding figures were 53 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively.18 9
In 1990, 54 per cent of the physicians surveyed stated that circumstances
exist where a doctor should raise voluntary euthanasia as a possibility
with the patient.190 There is a concern that the voluntariness of a request
186 H. Jochemsen & J. Keown, "Voluntary Euthanasia Under Control? Further Empirical
Evidence from the Netherlands" (1999) 25 J. Med. Ethics 16 at 17 [hereinafter "Under Control"].
See also, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, "Assistance in Discussing End of Life Issues and Care
at the End of Life in the Netherlands" (2001), online: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken <http:ll
www.minbuza.nl/english/Content.aspkey=409696&pad =257570,257588,257609,411276>
[hereinafter "Euthanasia and Other Decisions"].
1 8 7 H. Hendin et aL, "Physician-As sisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Lessons
From the Dutch" (1997) 277 J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1720 at 1720. The reader should note that five of
the twleve Hendin et aL calculations of the "actual figures" are incorrect. The miscalculations are as
follows: in the 1990 questionaire, 244 for PAS should be 257; in the 1990 interview study, 2445 for
euthanasia should be 2446, 380 for PAS should be 386 and 1350 for opioids given with explicit
intention should be 1287; in the 1995 interview, 1896 for opioids given with explicit intention should
be 1897. In addition, Hendin et aL based their "actual figure" calculations on percentage estimates,
which suggests that rounding is appropriate. This is consistent with the approach of other authors.
See, for example, "Under Control," supra note 186; and "Euthanasia and Other Decisions," supra
note 186.
188 "Special Issue," supra note 6 at 40: 8 per cent would never perform the practices but would
refer a patient to another physician, and 4 per cent would never participate and would not refer.
189 "End of Life in The Netherlands," supra note 184 at 1702: 9 per cent would never perform
the practices but would refer a patient to another physician and 3 per cent would never participate
and would not refer.
190 "Special Issue," supra note 6 at 102.
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can be compromised by such a suggestion.1 91 In all cases of voluntary
euthanasia, assisted suicide, and LAWER in 1990, the doctor initiated the
discussion 21 per cent of the time. In voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide cases only, the doctor initiated the discussion 12 per cent and 15
per cent of the time for 1990 and 1995, respectively.' 9 2 While such
instances are infrequent, they occur nonetheless and voluntariness must
be questioned in at least some cases.
Reported cases of physician-assisted death increased from 486 in
1990 to 1,466 in 1995. In light of the estimates of voluntary euthanasia
and assisted suicide, the notification rate increased from approximately
18 per cent to 41 per cent. Only two cases of physician-assisted death
without the explicit request of the patient in 1990 and three cases in 1995
were reported. 93 Thus, while the situation is improving, reporting rates
are low and this is extremely troubling.
According to the Pi study in 1990, the patients had good insight
into the disease and prognosis in all of the voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide cases. There were no alternatives 79 per cent of the time.
In 17 per cent of the cases, alternatives were available but the patient no
longer wanted them. Four per cent of the voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide cases did not involve an explicit request. Similarly, 6 per
cent of the cases did not involve a repeated request. Eighty-four per cent
of the physicians consulted with colleagues and only 60 per cent kept
written records.194 The DC study in 1995 revealed that 100 per cent of
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide cases involved an explicit
request; however, 3 per cent of the patients were not competent. Of all
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide cases, 4 per cent were
discussed with no one.195 A comparison between the most recent
reported and unreported cases in 1990 and 1995 indicated that, as far as
the satisfaction of the substantive requirements was concerned, no
differences existed. However, procedural requirements showed a
decrease in cases not discussed with colleagues in 1995 (11 per cent)
191 H. Hendin, "Correspondence: Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the
Netherlands" (1997) 336 New Eng. J. Med. 1385 at 1385 [hereinafter "Euthanasia"].
192 p.j. van der Maas & G. van der Wal, "Correspondence: Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
Suicide in the Netherlands" (1997) 336 New Eng. J. Med. 1385.
193 G. van der Wal et al., "Evaluation of the Notification Procedure for Physician-Assisted
Death in the Netherlands" (1996) 335 New Eng. J. Med. 1706 at 1707.
194 "Special Issue," supra note 6 at 50.
195 "End of Life in The Netherlands,"supra note 184 at 1704: 83 per cent were discussed with a
colleague, 33 per cent with a nurse, and 70 per cent with relatives or others (more than one answer
was possible).
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compared to 1990 (16 per cent). Written reports were also more
available in 1995: 81 per cent of the cases as opposed to 60 per cent of
the cases in 1990.196 Another report on the 1990/1995 data indicated that
a physician administered some or all of the medication in 91 per cent of
the voluntary euthanasia cases, and a nurse or person other than the
physician or nurse did so 5 per cent of the time. While 72 per cent of the
doctors interviewed remained present until death, a physician was not
present at all in 2 per cent of the cases. With regard to assisted suicide,
only 52 per cent of the cases involved the continuous presence of a
physician and the absentee rate was 10 per cent.1 97
With regard to LAWER, the Pi study in 1990 indicated that 27 per
cent of the respondents had performed such an act at some time and 32
per cent have never done so but could conceive of doing sog198 The
corresponding figures for 1995 were 23 per cent and 32 per cent,
respectively.199 Of the most recent cases in 1990, patients were totally
able to make a decision 14 per cent of the time and there were
alternatives in 8 per cent of the cases 200 In 1995, there was no explicit
request but the issue was discussed or a wish was stated in 52 per cent of
the cases. In the remaining 48 per cent of the cases, the decision was not
discussed and there was no previous wish. Of all cases in 1995, 21 per
cent involved competent patients and 5 per cent were discussed with no
one.201 LAWER is of great concern as such cases can be treated as
non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia.202
The information above indicates that there are problems in the
Netherlands. Many of the substantive and procedural requirements
listed in Part IV are not being adhered to. The majority of the cases are
not being reported. Additionally, Dutch physicians are participating in
non-voluntary and quite possibly, involuntary euthanasia. Given the
abundance of data, it is not difficult to understand why the situation in
the Netherlands draws so much attention. Since there was no reliable
research before 1990, however, it is unclear whether the voluntary
196 van der Wal, supra note 193 at 1708.
197 j. Groenewoud et at, "Clinical Problems with the Performance of Euthanasia and
Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Netherlands" (2000) 342 New Eng. J. Med. 551 at 553.
198 "Special Issue," supra note 6 at 58: 41 per cent would never do so.
199 "End of Life in The Netherlands," supra note 184 at 1701: 45 per cent would never do so.
200 "Special Issue," supra note 6 at 61-62. Patients were not totally able to make a decision in
11 per cent of the cases and totally unable 75 per cent of the time.
201 "End of Life in The Netherlands," supra note 184 at 1704.
202 "Euthanasia,"supra note 191.
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euthanasia and assisted suicide rates have substantially increased. Thus,
there is no evidence of the presence of a slippery slope.203 Furthermore,
while some abuses are occurring, it is far from certain that the situation
is out of control or that the cause of any problems is related to the
permissibility of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide. Before
commentators point their fingers at the Dutch sliding down the slippery
slope, these critics might do well to look at the goings-on in their own
countries.
B. Australia
Research on end-of-life decisions in Australia is rather plentiful
and quite enlightening. In a study of 943 Australian nurses reported in
1993, 218 stated that they had been asked by a doctor to participate in
euthanasia, and 85 per cent complied with the request. Additionally,
sixteen nurses, without having been approached by a doctor, granted a
patient's request for euthanasia. In a survey published in 1994, 52 per
cent of the 278 Australian nurses sampled took active measures in order
to bring about a patient's death, frequently without a request to do so
from the patient or his/her family.24 Another 1994 report indicated that
47 per cent of the Southern Australian physicians sampled received a
request for assisted death or euthanasia at some time and that 19 per
cent had participated in the practices.205 In a 1995 paper delivered at an
Australian HIV conference, 18 per cent (forty one) of the doctors
surveyed had participated in assisted suicide. These physicians had
received 438 requests. Surprisingly, four people who received assistance
were healthy 06 Evidently, Australian doctors and nurses are
participating in acts of euthanasia and assisted suicide, sometimes in
extremely dubious circumstances.
In 1996, a study was conducted that largely duplicated the
203 R. Gillon, "Euthanasia in The Netherlands-Down the Slippery Slope?" (1999) 25 J. Med.
Ethics 3 at 4.
204 D.A. Asch, "The Role of Critical Care Nurses in Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide" (1996)
334 New Eng. J. Med. 1374 at 1374 [hereinafter "Critical Care Nurses"].
205 C.A. Stevens & R. Hassan, "Management of Death, Dying and Euthanasia: Attitudes and
Practices of Medical Practitioners in South Australia" (1994) 20 J. Med. Ethics 41 at 41.
206 D. Buchanan, "Australia-Lenient Sentence in Euthanasia Case" (1996) 2 Can.
HIV/AIDS Pol'y Newsl. 25 at 25-26.
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"prospective study" in the Netherlands. 20 7 Of the 800 physicians that
made medical decisions concerning the end of life (MDEL), 3.2 per cent
(twenty six) reported engaging in euthanasia or assisted suicide. Of
these, 100 per cent involved an explicit request but 4 per cent did not
involve a competent patient. In 12 per cent of the cases, the decision was
discussed with no one. With regard to life-terminating acts without the
patient's explicit request (LAWER), 6.4 per cent (fifty one) of physicians
reported having done so. Of these, 31 per cent reported that there was
no explicit request, no wish expressed, and no discussion of the action
with the patient. Moreover, 6 per cent of the physicians engaging in
LAWER indicated that the action was neither requested nor discussed
with the patient and the patient was competent. Sixteen percent of the
physicians discussed the decision with absolutely no one.208 The study
also estimated the percentage of total deaths due to MDEL in Australia.
The results were compared to those of the Netherlands in 1995. The
rates of death in Australia during 1995 resulting from acts of euthanasia
(1.8 per cent) and physician-assisted suicide (0.1 per cent) were slightly
lower than those in the Netherlands (2.4 per cent and 0.2 per cent,
respectively). However, the LAWER rate was substantially higher: 3.5 per
cent in Australia as compared to 0.7 per cent in the Netherlands. 209 This
information indicates that incidents of assisted suicide and voluntary,
non-voluntary, and involuntary euthanasia are occurring in Australia.
The situation definitely invites "Dutch-like" criticism, especially with
regard to LAWER.
C. The United States
Assisted suicide and euthanasia (save perhaps for involuntary
euthanasia) are practiced in the United States. Retired pathologist, Dr.
Jack Kevorkian, had no qualms about openly performing dozens of so
called "medicides."210 But much also goes on behind closed doors. In
1995, 53 per cent of 117 doctors working with HIV patients in the San
Francisco Bay Area admitted to granting an assisted-suicide request on
207 H. Kuhse, "End-of-Life Decisions in Australian Medical Practice" (1997) 166 Med. J.
Australia 191 at 196.
208 Ibid. at 193-94.
209 Ibid. at 196: based on total number of deaths in Australia July 1994-June 1995 (125,771).
210 D.A. Pratt & B. Steinbock, "Death with Dignity or Unlawful Killing: The Ethical and
Legal Debate Over Physician-Assisted Death" (1997) 33 Crim. L. Bull. 226 at 229.
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at least one occasion to a patient suffering from AIDS. 211 The results of a
1996 survey involving 852 critical care nurses showed that 16 per cent
had participated in an act of euthanasia or assisted suicide at least once
during their careers, 65 per cent doing so three times or less, and 5 per
cent doing so twenty or more times.212 In that same year, over 1,900
American physicians completed surveys on euthanasia and assisted
suicide 213 The results indicated that 18.3 per cent and 11.1 per cent
received a request for assisted suicide or a lethal injection, respectively.
Of the entire sample, 3.3 per cent had written a prescription conducive
to suicide and 4.7 per cent had administered a lethal injection. The
patient characteristics of the most recent cases of euthanasia or assisted
suicide (eighty one) showed that assisted suicide cases involved: a
patient request (95 per cent), an explicit request (75 per cent), a
repeated request (51 per cent), twelve or more years of education (93
per cent), a second opinion (less than 1 per cent), and cancer (70 per
cent). Cases of euthanasia involved: a patient request (39 per cent), an
explicit request (21 per cent), a repeated request (53 per cent), twelve or
more years of education (83 per cent), a second opinion (32 per cent),
and cancer (23 per cent).214
A study published in 1998 was conducted in order to determine
whether American physicians were adhering to the proposed safeguards
for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.215 Of the 355 oncologist
respondents, 15.8 per cent (fifty six) admitted to participating in one of
the practices. The results of in-depth interviews with thirty-eight of the
fifty-six oncologists revealed that 5.3 per cent reported administering
lethal injections, 73.7 per cent prescribed medication knowing the
patient would commit suicide, and 21.1 per cent engaged in both
procedures. Cancers were the most common underlying conditions. 216 In
78.9 per cent of the cases, the patient initiated the request and 63.2 per
cent of the time it was repeated. Cases were only discussed with other
211 LR. Slome et al., "Physician-Assisted Suicide and Patients with Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Disease" (1997) 336 New Eng. J. Med. 417 at 419.
212 "Critical Care Nurses," supra note 204 at 1375. Not all of the reported cases of euthanasia
were performed pursuant to requests or with the knowledge of family members, surrogates, or the
patients themselves.
213 Meier, supra note 86 at 1194.
214 Ibid. at 1197.
215 E.J. Emanuel et al., "The Practice of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the
United States: Adherence to Proposed Safeguards and Effects on Physicians" (1998) 280(6) J. Am.
Med. Ass'n 507 at 508.
216 Ibid. at 509.
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doctors 39.5 per cent of the time.21 7
A study released in the year 2000 revealed that of the 152 United
States oncologists sampled, 48 per cent received requests for euthanasia
or assisted suicide. None performed euthanasia, 7 per cent (eleven)
engaged in assisted suicide, and 2 per cent (three) ended life without a
request. The most frequent diagnosis was cancer, and cases were only
discussed with other physicians 8 per cent of the time.2 18 The results of a
comparative study of those that died under Oregon's DDA in 1998
(sixteen) and 1999 (twenty seven) was also published in 2000.219 The
median age of those assisted was seventy and seventy-one in 1998 and
1999, respectively. High school and college graduates comprised 81 per
cent of those aided in 1998 and 92 per cent in 1999. The most common
underlying illness was cancer in both years. At the time of request in
1998, 67 per cent were enrolled in a hospice program. The
corresponding figure for 1999 was 44 per cent. Immediately before
death, 73 per cent (1998) and 78 per cent (1999) of those receiving
assistance were enrolled in such programs. All of the persons in 1999
were insured and 6 per cent (one) in 1998 were not.220
A number of propositions may be drawn from this information.
The notion that vulnerable persons/groups, such as the uneducated, the
uninsured, and the disabled (the most common underlying condition
being cancer) will end up requesting assisted suicide (in light of the DDA
research) or euthanasia, is highly questionable. Hospice and palliative
care do not necessarily eliminate a person's desire to die. Moreover,
assisted suicide, voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, and quite
probably involuntary euthanasia, are being practiced in America, both
within and outside the medical context. Violations of proposed
guidelines are also occurring. American critics of the Dutch experience
should consider being a little more attentive to their own situation.
D. Canada
Research on voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada
is quite scarce, but what little does exist is illuminating. A small study in
2171bid. at-510.
218 D.L. Willems et aL, "Attitudes and Practices Concerning the End of Life: A Comparison
Between Physicians From the United States and the Netherlands" (2000) 160 Arch. Intern. Med. 63
at 66.
219 "Suicide in Oregon," supra note 81.
2 20 Ibid. at 600.
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1992-1993 indicated that respondents from various professional
backgrounds participated in the deaths of thirty-four persons with AIDS
and one afflicted with cancer. 221 The results of an Alberta survey
published in 1993 revealed that, of the 1391 physician respondents, 19
per cent had received at least one request for euthanasia.222 Of all
respondents, 33 per cent stated that they would not report a colleague
who had engaged in euthanasia to anyone.223 Unfortunately, the survey
did not ascertain whether doctors had actually participated in the
practice. A minor study reported in 1996 revealed that at least eleven
persons assisted in twenty-five AIDS-related deaths.224 Another small
study involving Canadian nurses in AIDS care was published in 1998 and
indicated that 22.2 per cent (ten) of forty-four respondents received
patient requests for voluntary euthanasia. The corresponding figure for
assisted suicide was 11.1 per cent (five) of forty-two respondents. Of the
total nurses responding (forty five), 57.8 per cent (twenty six) stated that
physicians perform voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide and 28.9
per cent (thirteen) stated that nurses do likewise.22s
Further insight as to the occurrences of euthanasia and assisted
suicide in Canada can be attained through an examination of criminal
trials and non-criminal hearings. In 1941, an Alberta couple was
acquitted of killing their two-year-old son who suffered from cancer; he
was asphyxiated with carbon monoxide.2 26 In 1991, a physician
administered a lethal dose of morphine to two elderly patients and was
not criminally charged. In that same year, a nurse gave a lethal injection
to a seventy-eight-year-old patient. He was convicted of administering a
noxious substance, received three years' probation, a suspended
221 R.D. Ogden, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Persons with Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIM) (Pitts Meadows, B.C.: Perreault
Goodman, 1994) at 67.
2 2 2 T.D. Kinsella & M.J. Verhoef, "Alberta Euthanasia Survey: 1. Physicians' Opinions About
the Morality and Legalization of Active Euthanasia" (1993) 148 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 1921 at 1921.
223 T.D. Kinsella & M.J. Verhoef, "Alberta Euthanasia Survey: 2. Physicians' Opinions About
the Acceptance of Active Euthanasia as a Medical Act and the Reporting of Such Practice" (1993)
148 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 1929 at 1929.
224 L. Shap, "Canadian Study on Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide and HIV/AIDS" (1997) 3 Can.
HIV/AIDS Pol'y Newsl. 24.
225 M.G. Young & R.D. Ogden, "End-of-Life Issues: A Survey of English-Speaking Canadian
Nurses in AIDS Care" (1998) 9:2 J. Ass'n Nurses in AIDS Care 18 at 22-23.
226 B. Sneiderman, "Latimer, Davis, and Doerksen: Mercy Killing and Assisted Suicide on-the
Op. Ed. Page" (1998) 25 Man. W. 449 at 455.
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sentence, and was prohibited from ever practicing nursing.227 In 1992, it
was reported that a Montreal doctor administered a lethal injection to
an AIDS patient. The matter was not pursued as the Qu6bec College of
Physicians advised against prosecution.228 In 1993, a doctor was
convicted of administering a noxious substance (potassium chloride) to a
cancer patient that had been removed from a ventilator. He received a
suspended sentence and three years probation. 229 In 1994, Sue
Rodriguez apparently died with the help of a physician and to this day,
the doctor remains anonymous.230 In 1993, Robert Latimer was charged
with second-degree murder for asphyxiating his daughter with carbon
monoxide; she had severe cerebral palsy. Several years later, after a
prolonged court battle, Latimer's conviction and sentence were upheld
by the Supreme Court of Canada.231 In 1995, an eighty-one-year-old
woman helped her ill husband commit suicide and attempted to take her
own life. She pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received eighteen
months probation.23 2 In 1996, Dr. Nancy Morrison administered
potassium chloride to a patient after he had been removed from a
respirator. The judge at the preliminary inquiry held that there was
insufficient evidence to commit Dr. Morrison to stand trial for first-
degree murder. The Crown application to quash the decision was
dismissed in 1998.233 In 1999, the Court of Appeal of Ontario dismissed
2 27 The cases of Dr. Peter Graff and Scott Mataya cited in Ogden, supra note 221 at 20- 24.
228 B. Sneiderman, "The Rodriguez Case: Where do We Go From Here-A
Multi-Dimentional (6-Layered) Approach" (1994) 2 Health L. J. 1 at 9.
229 de la Rocha, supra note 131.
230 "Death with Dignity in Toronto," supra note 1.
231 Latimer was initially convicted of second-degree murder in 1994. Latimer appealed the
decision to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, but his appeal was dismissed: R. v. Latimer, [1995] 8
W.W.R. 609. However, Latimer's conviction was quashed and a new trial was ordered by the
Supreme Court of Canada when it was ascertained that the prosecutor interviewed potential jurors
regarding their views on subjects of significance in the case: R. v. Latimer, [1997] S.C.R. 217. At his
second trial, Latimer was once again convicted for second-degree murder; however, Justice Noble,
the trial judge, granted Latimer a constitutional exemption from the mandatory minimum sentence
and instead sentenced Latimer to one year of imprisonment and one year on probation. The Crown
appealed the decision to grant a constitutional exemption and Latimer appealed his conviction to
the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. The court dismissed Latimer's appeal and allowed the Crown's
appeal from the decision to grant a constitutional exemption: R. v. Latimer (1998), [1999] 6 W.W.R.
118 (1997). Latimer appealed his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Court dismissed Latimer's appeal and upheld Latimer's conviction for second-degree murder and
the accompanying mandatory minimum sentence of ten years: R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1,
online: QL (SCJ).
232R v. Brush, [1995] O.J. No. 656 (Prov. Div.), online: QL (OJ) [hereinafter Brush].
2 33 1F. v. Morrison (1998), 174 N.S.R. (2d) 201 (S.C.).
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the appeal of a doctor who pled guilty to two counts of aiding suicide
after he prescribed lethal doses of Seconal to two HIV patients who were
not suffering from AIDS. The trial judge imposed sentences of
incarceration for two years less a day and three years probation to be
served concurrently. 23 4 In July of 2000, the Manitoba Crown stayed
charges against Bert Doerkson, eighty-one, for assisting in his
cancer-stricken wife's suicide.23 5
This information suggests several things. The courts have dealt
with many cases leniently. Little is known about the frequency of
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in the medical context and
more research is necessary. But the material does verify that incidents of
voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, and assisted suicide, are
occurring in Canada. In light of the more extensive research from other
countries, it might well be surmised that involuntary euthanasia within
the medical context is being practiced here also.
E. Summary and Conclusion
The situation in the Netherlands is far from perfect. Assisted
suicide, voluntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, and quite possibly,
involuntary euthanasia are practiced, often in questionable
circumstances. Many of the substantive and procedural requirements are
also violated. By acknowledging the existence of such practices, the
Dutch have invited criticism. Although euthanasia and assisted suicide
are prohibited elsewhere, they are practiced nevertheless. Whatever one
might think of the Dutch approach, it is speculation to conclude that a
slippery slope exists or that the slide is already complete in the
Netherlands. Since there is no reliable research in the Netherlands
before 1990, the claim that "permissibility" necessarily entails "slippery
slopes" cannot be established. The research emerging from Oregon casts
further doubt on such a claim. This is not to say that permitting the
practices will not lead to problems; the potential is real. It does not
follow, however, that adequate safeguards cannot be developed
234 R. v. Genereux (1999), 44 O.R. (3d) 339. Both the Crown and the accused appealed
sentence. Leave was granted to both parties, but the court of appeal dismissed both appeals.
235 Vancouver Province, "Winnipeg (CP) - The Manitoba Crown..." (28 July 2000), online:
Vancouver Province
<http:/iwww.vancouverprovince.com/cgi-binlnewsite.pl?adcode=p-nw&modul... /n072825.htm>
(date accessed: 28 July 2000).
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elsewhere because the situation in the Netherlands is problematic. A
different approach is necessary.
VII. PRACTICAL MEASURES
Arguably, too much medical and judicial discretion, a post hoc
reporting procedure, and a lack of legislative input, has given rise to the
current state of affairs in the Netherlands. In Canada, Parliament has
declined and still refuses to deal with the continued prohibition of
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, preferring instead that the
courts consider the issue.236 Canadian and American case law suggests
that the topic warrants a political response.237 Justice Souter, in
Glucksberg, explained why the matter is best left for legislators: "[n]ot
only do they have more flexible mechanisms for factfinding than the
Judiciary, but their mechanisms include the power to experiment,
moving forward and pulling back as facts emerge within their own
jurisdictions." 238 Although the drafting of adequate legislation may be a
cumbersome task, it is possible. Foreign schemes, such as the DDA, 239
RoTi,240 and the Dutch requirements are highly instructive. What
follows is a proposal of what voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide
legislation in Canada should include.
A. Proposed Legislation
First of all, the title of an Act should attempt to convey what lies
at the foundation of the legislation. For example, the "Voluntary and
Compassionate Death Act" might appropriately characterize Canadian
legislation. The Act would include a preamble to the following effect:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to permit the practices of
non-voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. It would also include a suitable
definition section and a residency provision. The Act would permit the
practice of both voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide in the medical
context. It can be argued, however, that assisted suicide is preferable for
236 Hon. B. McLachlin, "Charter Myths" (1999) 33 U.B.C.L. Rev. 23 at 32.
2 37 Rodriguez, supra note 26; Brush, supra note 232; and Glucksberg, supra note 72 at 788.
23 8 Glucksberg, ibkL
2 3 9 DDA, supra note 77.
2 4 0 Romrl, supra note 59.
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a number of reasons. First, it minimizes the involvement of third parties.
Second, persons should not ask others to do what they can do for
themselves. Third, assisted suicide decreases the risk of traumatizing
another party.241 Additionally, it increases the patient's involvement and
stresses the voluntariness and genuineness of the request. Finally, it
might also ease the consciences of those that assist.242 Nonetheless,
given the similarity between voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide,
and the justifiability of each, voluntary euthanasia must also be
permitted. Forcing life on those physically unable to complete the act
would be cruel since they have, potentially, years of agony to experience
as compared to one who is "knocking on death's door."243 As well, such
policy does not adequately respect the principles of autonomy and
beneficence. Moreover, if problems are experienced during an assisted
suicide, then medical staff might need to intervene.244 Permitting
voluntary euthanasia would also help to insulate the legislation from a
constitutional challenge pursuant to section 15 of the Charter.245
As opposed to the post hoc reporting procedures in all of the
jurisdictions mentioned above, a system of pre-authorization should be
in place.24 6 Such a procedure would ensure predictability in the law.
Applications would be submitted to a provincial panel for approval.247
The panel could include permanent and rotating positions for: a medical
ethicist; a palliative care specialist; a psychologist; a lawyer; a social
worker; a coroner's representative; a specialist with experience relevant
to the specific case;248 a criminologist, sociologist, or other academic
with a background in the humanities; a nurse; a patient advocate. Such a
panel would be in a better position than a court to evaluate the
legitimacy of individual cases. 249 Although the application process would
241 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 465-66.
242 "Legal Bounds," supra note 123 at 166-67.
243 Ibid.
244 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 466.
245 See, for example, Roduiguez, supra note 26.
246 A system of pre-authorization was also suggested by Gilmour, supra note 42 at 257-58; and
T.O. Nielsen, "Guidelines for Legalized Euthanasia in Canada: A Proposal" (1998) 31:7 Annals,
Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada 314 at 317 [hereinafter "Guidelines for
Canada"].
247 Regional ethics committees were suggested by "Guidelines for Canada," ibid
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
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detract from patient autonomy,25 0 the procedure strikes an appropriate
balance between absolute prohibition and unqualified respect for
autonomy.251 The number of members on a given panel should be no
less than five, in order to ensure a balanced appraisal. Majority opinion
would be decisive. A national committee could monitor provincial
decisions, direct research (integral to such a legislative scheme) and
report its findings, and suggest whether adjustments are in order.
A written application for assistance in dying would have to be
filed by the patient. Where a patient is physically unable to sign an
application, a proxy signor would be allowed to do so. Given the
gravity/finality of the practices, restricting eligibility to those eighteen
years of age and older would be acceptable. 25 2 The patient would have to
be competent and all applicants would be required to submit to mental
status assessments. Since the Act would not permit non-voluntary or
involuntary euthanasia, patients would have to be competent
immediately before the procedure is initiated. As a consequence,
requests cannot be premised on advance directives or on decisions made
by proxies. The patient would have to be informed of all the relevant
medical facts. The request would have to be voluntary; not coerced or
economically influenced. The request must be repeated in order to
account for any variability involved in the desire to die.253 There would
also be a mandatory waiting period between the making of requests and
the performance of the procedures. The patient would have the right to
rescind the request at any time, in any manner.
The practices of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide would
be limited to instances where pain and suffering is reasonably
unacceptable to the individual. Reasonable alternatives would also need
to be explored. Thus, assessments of suffering and health care
alternatives would be based on a mixed subjective/objective model: a
balanced approach. With regard to alternative care, the more intrusive
the procedure, the more reasonable it would be to refuse it. Ample
weight should be given to the principles of autonomy and beneficence at
all times. Suffering would need to stem from an irreversible
250 M.A. Somerville, "Guidelines for Legalized Euthanasia in Canada: A Rejection of a
Proposal" (1999) 32 Annals, Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada 8 at 8-9.
251 T. 0. Nielsen, "Response" (1999) 32:1 Annals, Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons
of Canada 9 at 10.
2 5 2 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 479.
253 H.M. Chochinov et aL, "Will to Live in the Terminally I1l" (2000) 15 Issues L. & Med. 334
at 335.
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physiologically based condition.254 A "Schedule of Medical Conditions"
would outline the eligible medical conditions and corresponding time
limitations within which the procedures could be performed. For
example, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), AIDS, various types of
cancer, and total physical incapacity could have tailored time limitations
of six months, one year, or none at all. The medical profession (including
nurses), in conjunction with the legal community, would determine these
time limits in order to account for all of the medical issues and legal
ramifications. Such a schedule would eliminate ambiguities, provide for
flexibility, and ensure that amendments are debatable and occur in the
open. In cases of total physical incapacity when death is not imminent,
patients would have to consult with a patient advocate. Given the length
of life shortening involved, this further requirement would be justified.
An applicant would have to be examined by two physicians that
verify the above requirements have been met. The physicians and the
psychologist would have to submit independent reports, not simply sign
another's assessment. This would guard against abuse and promote
accountability. Someone with palliative care experience would have to
consult with the patient. A physician would be entitled to introduce the
options of voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide; they would be
legitimate alternatives and should be openly discussed. Second opinions
and mental assessments would ensure that such suggestions do not
unduly affect the decisionmaking process.
The medical profession would determine the appropriate drugs
to be utilized and establish a procedure of acceptable administration.
Persons eligible to give assistance would not be limited to physicians. A
qualified nurse, in the presence of a physician, could carry out the
procedure as long as the established standards of practice are adhered
to. This would allow for the maximization of medical personnel
autonomy and ensure adequate procedural availability. A physician
would be required to remain present until the individual died. The
procedure would be performed in front of witnesses in order to provide
a check on abuse and error.2 55 One of the witnesses would have to be
unrelated to the patient and could not stand to gain from the death. The
practices would not have to be performed in a medical setting; rather,
they could be carried out at the homes of people choosing to die in more
comfortable surroundings. No medical professional would be required to
perform either procedure. There would be no need to impose new
254 It should be remembered that unassisted suicide is an option for a person suffering from a
non-somatically based condition where there is a wish to die.
255 Otlowski, supra note 38 at 491.
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criminal penalties, as the Code, 1985256 provisions would remain in force.
However, since the courts tend to treat physicians leniently, minimum
three to six month suspensions of medical licences might accompany
violations.25 7 The Act would also delineate its effect on the construction
of contracts, wills, statutes, and annuity and insurance policies. 25 8
VIII. CONCLUSION
Autonomy underscores the right of Canadians to have
life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn. Together, the principles
of autonomy and beneficence propel Canadian palliative care policy, the
CMA'S Code of Ethics, and informed the Rodriguez decision. These
principles provide the foundation for justifying voluntary euthanasia and
assisted suicide. When people make voluntary and informed decisions
that the continuation of life is not to their benefit, they should be free,
with qualification, to seek assistance in order to end their lives in a
compassionate and acceptable manner. Withdrawing and withholding
life-sustaining treatment and administering palliative care that has the
effect of shortening life, differ from voluntary euthanasia and assisted
suicide only in degree, not in kind. All of these practices can be viewed
as legitimate exceptions to the principle of the "sanctity of life."
While slippery slope arguments raise some serious concerns, they
can ultimately be dismissed. Admittedly, there are risks with the Dutch
model due to the possibility of a slippery slope. However, the other
countries discussed have not adequately explored what is transpiring in
their own back yards. They are open to many of the same criticisms given
that euthanasia and assisted suicide are being practiced in these
countries. There is evidence of cause for concern in the Netherlands, but
the evidence is insufficient to warrent a blanket prohibition in Canada.
Too much medical and judicial discretion, a post hoc reporting
procedure, and a lack of legislative input has given rise to the Dutch
status quo. A different approach, such as the one delineated above,
would prevent abuses from occurring and maintain the prohibition of
non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. The experience in Oregon
supports the assertion that similar legislation is feasible. Public opinion
strongly supports legislative reform, as does much of the Canadian
256 Code, 1985, supra note 12.
257 "Guidelines for Canada," supra note 246 at 317.
258 See, for example: DDA, supra note 77 at § 127.870, s. 3.12, § 127.875, s. 3.13, § 127.880, s.
3.14; and ROTM, SUMPRA NOTE 59, SS. 16,18,19,20.
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medical community. Consequently, since legislators are in the best
position to deal with these issues, change in the existing law should be
accomplished by the government, not the judiciary.

